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HALF A LOAF IS BETTER THAN 
NONE: SULLIV AN REVISITED 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Janet and Mark Sullivan married in September of 1967. 
Mark entered medical school the following year while Janet 
completed her undergraduate studies. For the next nine years of 
their ten year marriage, Mark attended medical school for four 
years, then completed his internship and his residency for five 
years. Janet provided support by working full time, and then 
part time when they moved to Oregon in 1972 for the benefit of 
Mark's career. She continued to work part time after their 
daughter was born in 1974.1 
Janet and Mark separated in 1977 or 1978,2 then Mark set 
up his practice in Orange County, California, with money bor-
rowed from his mother. Assets acquired during the marriage 
consisted of used furniture and two automobiles with payments 
outstanding.3 Mark, however, possessed his medical degree, and 
Janet's attempt to gain an interest in Mark's degree catapulted 
the Sullivan dissolution into the national spotlight. Courts in 
sister states awaited California's approach to what has become 
the most hotly contested issue in family law today! 
1. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 765, 691 P.2d 1020, 1021-22, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 354, 355-56 (1984). The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment ordering the husband to pay the wife's costs and attorney fees, but reversed the 
trial court's judgment denying compensation for contributions to the husband's educa-
tion and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed 
in its opinion. Id. at 770, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359. For a complete discus-
sion of the court's opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 162-205. 
2. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (Ct. App. 1982) (appellate 
decision omitted from the official reporter pursuant to CAL. R. CT. 976(d», aff'd and 
reu'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). Mark contended the date 
of separation was June 15, 1977, while Janet contended the date of separation was April 
15, 1978. The court of appeal explained that Janet stipulated at trial that Mark's medi-
cal practice was his separate property because evidence indicated that the practice was 
set up after the separation, regardless of which date was used. Sulliuan, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 
798. 
3. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 766, 691 P.2d 1020, 1022, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 354, 356 (1984). 
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A. The Issues 
The parties' situation in In re Marriage of Sulliuanr> is rep-
resentative: "Typically, one spouse attains a degree whil~ the 
other provides support; then a divorce occurs soon after gradua-
tion. Usually there are few assets immediately available, but one 
spouse leaves the marriage with an education and increased 
earning potential while the other spouse is given nothing for her 
efforts."6 The working spouse has provided financial and emo-
tional support, in addition, often, to taking on an additional 
measure of household chores. The supporting spouse usually ex-
pects that these present sacrifices will be rewarded by a more 
comfortable lifestyle in the future once the student spouse grad-
uates and begins applying newly acquired professional skills. Be-
cause the true value of a degree is the potential for increased 
earning capacity, a conflict arises between equitable considera-
tions and property division laws when, upon dissolution of the 
marriage, the supporting spouse seeks an interest in the degree. 
Although the degree has been earned through expenditures of 
community effort and money and should conceptually fall within 
the definition of community or marital property,7 the future 
earnings which represent its true value are the separate prop-
erty6 of the professional spouse and are not reachable through a 
property division. 
B. Approaches 
The interest, if any, of the supporting spouse in the degree 
of the student spouse upon dissolution of the marriage has in-
creasingly divided courts in both community property9 and equi-
DISTRIBUTION: LITIGATION AND DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES 1, 3 (1984). 
5. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 
(1984). See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
6. Comment, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution Pro-
ceedings, 56 WASH. L. REV. 277, 282-83 (1981). 
7. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (West 1982). "Community property is property acquired 
by husband and wife, or either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate prop-
erty of either." Id. 
8. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1983). "The earnings and accumulations of a 
spouse. . . while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate prop-
erty of the other spouse." Id. Accord CAL. CIV. CODE § 5119 (West 1983). "After the 
rendition of a judgment decreeing legal separation of the parties, the earnings and accu-
mulations of each party are the separate property of the party acquiring such earnings or 
accumulations." Id. 
9. There are eight community property states: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1976 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/3
1985] SULLIVAN REVISITED 529 
table distributionlO jurisdictions.l1 The approaches adopted by 
& Supp. 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 32-713 
(1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 159 (West 1952 & Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975 & 
Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1985). See 1 A. OLDFATHER, J. 
KOSEL, W. REPPY, JR., J. McKNIGHT, W. DASILVA, H. LIPSEY, A. PAGANO & G. SKOLOFF, 
VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 3.01, at 3 n.6 (1984) [hereinafter 
cited as VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION]. 
10. There are forty-one equitable distribution states: ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1983 & 
Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962 & Supp. 
1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 
(West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-13 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1976 & Supp. 1983); 
Marriage & Dissolution Act § 503, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & 
Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11 (1980 & Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE § 598.21 
(1981 & Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981 & Supp. 1984); MD. FAM. 
LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1958 & Supp. 
1983); MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 552.19, 552.401 (1967 & Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 
(1969 & Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (1977 & Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
40-4-202 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1983); 
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-23 (1970 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B (Mc-
Kinney 1977 & Supp. 1984-85); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-
24 (1981 & Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West 1961 & Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 107-105 (1971 & 
Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-
16.1 (1981 & Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
36-821 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1974 & 
Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 20-107.3 (1983 & Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32 (Supp. 
1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981 & Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1982 
& Supp. 1984). See VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION, supra note 9, § 3.01, at 2 n.2. 
One state, Mississippi, is a title jurisdiction, in which property is distributed upon 
dissolution to the spouse in whose name title is placed, regardless of the contributions of 
each spouse in acquiring the property. However, Mississippi has indicated equitable dis-
tribution principles will be adopted in situations in which strict adherence to the title 
rules would produce inequitable results. [d. § 3.02, at 8. 
The fundamental concepts underlying community property and equitable distribu-
tion are the same. Both systems are based on a modern view of marriage as an economic 
partnership of equals. There is a general presumption that any property acquired during 
the marriage is community or marital property. This general rule, however, is subject to 
the exception that any property acquired either prior to marriage or during marriage by 
gift or inheritance is the separate property of the acquiring spouse. Furthermore, each 
system classifies, as separate property, any property acquired during marriage by use of 
separate property. 
While the systems are quite similar with respect to the acquisition of property, they 
are significantly different in the manner in which property is distributed upon divorce. 
Most equitable distribution states provide for distribution of property on an equitable 
basis, according to factors expressly stated in their respective statutes. On the other 
hand, three community property states-California, New Mexico, and Louisi-
ana-require an equal distribution of the community property. The five remaining com-
munity property jurisdictions, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Texas, and Washington are hy-
brid; they provide for equitable distribution of the community property upon 
dissolution. See generally id. §§ 3.02, 3.05, 18.05, 20.02, 20.04 (basic principles of equita-
ble distribution and community property). 
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courts or suggested by commentators fall generally into four cat-
egories: 1) deny any relief to the supporting spouse; 2) allow re-
imbursement for costs incurred; 3) allow for alimony either in 
lieu of or in addition to property divisions in appropriate cases; 
and 4) characterize the degree or the enhanced earning capacity 
of the degree holder as a marital asset subject to valuation and 
distribution. 
Each approach has inherent drawbacks. Complete denial of 
11. Except where otherwise indicated, the wife supported the husband who earned a 
degree in law, medicine, or business. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 
196 (Ct. App. 1982) (law degree); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 
1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (law degree); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 
574 P.2d 75 (1978) (master's degree in business administration); In re Marriage of Mc-
Vey, 641 P.2d 300 (Colo. Ct. App. '1981) (graduate degree); Zahler v. Zahler, 8 FAM. L. 
REP. (BNA) 2694 (Conn. Super. Ct., Aug. 5, 1982) (medical degree); Wright v. Wright, 
469 A.2d 803 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) (dental degree); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (two bachelor of science degrees); Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 
992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (law degree); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 
234, 470 N.E.2d 551 (1984) (osteopathy degree and license to practice surgery); In re 
Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981) (prior to marriage, 
couple lived together while husband attended medical school); In re Marriage of 
McManama, 272 Ind. 483, 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980) (law degree); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. 
App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977) (doctorate degree in education); In re Marriage of 
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (master's degree and law degree); In re Mar-
riage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (law degree); Inman v. Inman, 
648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982) (dental degree); McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1983) (dental degree); Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) 
(medical degree); Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. P. and Fam. Ct., Dec. 
23, 1981) (dental degree); Watling ·v. Watling, 127 Mich. App. 624, 339 N.W.2d 505 
(1983) (dental degree); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 
(1983) (law degree); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981) (medical 
degree); Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (law degree); Ruben v. 
Ruben, 461 A.2d 733 (N.H. 1983) (doctorate degree); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 
453 A.2d 527 (1982) (master's degree in business administration); Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 
510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) (medical degree); Muckelroy v. Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 
P.2d 1357 (1972) (medical license); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (medical degree); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 
N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (medical degree); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 
428 N.E.2d 445 (1980) (medical degree); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979) 
(medical degree); Adair v. Adair, 670 P.2d 1002 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (dental degree); 
Hodge v. Hodge, 486 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (medical degree); Wehrkamp v. 
Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264 (S.D. 1984) (dental degree); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 
357 N.W. 2d 250 (S.D. 1984) (medical degree); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1980) (medical degree); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168,677 P.2d 
152 (1984) (veterinary degree); Gillette v. Gillette, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984) 
(veterinary degree); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984) (medical 
degree); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984) (master's degree in 
accounting). 
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relief is viewed as harsh12 and grossly unjust. IS Reimbursement 
is criticized as inadequateU because it allows only for costs and 
not the real value, the increased earning potential, of the de-
gree. lei Alimony awards are assailed as both unavailablel6 and 
discretionary.17 Granting a share of enhanced earning capacity 
to the supporting spouse may be unfair to the degree-earning 
spousel8 and is contrary to the fundamental concept that a 
spouse's earnings after separation or divorce are his or her 
own.19 
C. California's Approach 
Effective January, 1985, the California Legislature amended 
the property division and spousal support statutes20 to provide a 
remedy to a working spouse who has supported a student spouse 
in attaining a professional degree.21 After a delay of two years 
pending legislative action, the California Supreme Court finally 
addressed the issue presented in In re Marriage of Sullivan.22 In 
remanding the case with instructions to apply the new statutes, 
12. E.g., Herring, Dividing a Diploma in a Divorce, 70 A.B.A. J. 84, 87 (1984). 
13. E.g., Recent Developments, Professional Degrees as Marital Property, 6 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 208, 216 (1983). 
14. E.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 
(1983). The court held, rather, that the husband's law degree was marital property be-
cause it was the result of mutual sacrifice and effort by both parties. Id. at 261-62, 337 
N.W.2d at 334. See infra text accompanying notes 60-65. 
15. E.g., Recent Developments, supra note 13, at 215. 
16. Id. at 218. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 215-16. 
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5118 (living separate and apart), 5119 (legal separation) (West 
1983). 
20. AB 3000 added § 4800.3 to the California Civil Code (1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1661, 
§ 2) (allows reimbursement for community contributions to education or training; assigns 
educational loans to spouse acquiring the education), amended § 4801(a)(1) of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code (1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1661, § 3) (includes as a factor in awarding spousal 
support the extent to which the supported spouse contributed to the attainment of the 
education, training, or license of the other spouse) and amended § 4800 of the California 
Civil Code (1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1661, § 1) (recodified § 48oo(b)(4) as § 4800.3(b)(2». For 
the complete text of the statutes and an analysis, see infra notes 120-54 and accompany-
ing text. 
21. In all but one recent case examined, the student spouse was the husband and 
the supporting spouse was the wife. For the sake of consistency in this Comment, "sup-
porting spouse" or "working spouse" will refer to the wife and "student spouse" or "pro-
fessional spouse" will refer to the husband. In terms of applicable law, these terms are, of 
course, gender neutral. 
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the court may have extended the remedy beyond well-settled 
principles of spousal support, contrary to clearly expressed legis-
lative intent.28 
If the supreme court did intend to extend the legislative 
remedy and the trial courts adhere to this interpretation, the 
law of spousal support will be disrupted, established standards 
will become confused and the resulting awards will be arbitrary, 
unpredictable and unfair. If the trial courts apply the new stat-
utes literally, the remedy will remain inadequate; the commu-
nity will be reimbursed neither for the time, effort and skills of 
the student spouse nor the fruits thereof, which by law are com-
munity property. Regardless of which tack the trial courts take 
in future cases, the outcome will be unacceptable. 
After surveying how other jurisdictions have characterized 
and distributed a professional degree, this Comment will analyze 
the new California statutes, the supreme court's response and 
then outline a proposal to accomplish what the legislature origi-
nally intended: to reimburse the community for all community 
property expended to obtain a professional degree. 
II. CHARACTERIZING A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE 
A. California: Is a Professional Degree or Education Com-
munity Property? 
Prior to the Sullivan cases,24 California appellate courts de-
23. Recommendation Relating to Reimbursement of Educational Expenses, 17 CAL. 
L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 229 (1984) [hereinafter cited 88 Recommendation]. The Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission states: "While it would be possible to revise the basic 
support standards, the Commission deems it inadvisable to disrupt the established sup-
port scheme .... " Id. at 234. For a complete discussion of the relevant statutes and the 
underlying legislative intent, see infra text accompanying notes 120-37. 
24. There were two decisions by the same court of appeal: In re Marriage of Sulli-
van, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2165 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1982) (appellate decision omitted 
from the official reporter pursuant to CAL. R. CT. 976(d», modified, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 
(Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1982), aff'd and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 
(1984); and In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1982), aff'd 
and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). 
The court, in its first opinion, held that although the student spouse's degree was his 
separate property, the community had an interest in the degree. Sullivan, 8 FAM. L. REP. 
(BNA) at 2166. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the value of 
the community interest. The husband petitioned for rehearing, which the court granted. 
On rehearing, the court noted there were no facts in evidence to support its original 
holding, but claimed this absence of evidence "presents no significant infirmity," 88 it is 
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nied any relief to a supporting spouse; they held that neither a 
legal education nor the right to practice law are community 
property.211 In its first Sullivan opinion,26 the court of appeal 
agreed with the Todd and Aufmuth courts that an education, 
degree and professional license acquired during marriage cannot 
be characterized as community property, but also held that a 
license to practice a profession is a valuable property right in 
which the community can have a financial interest.27 The same 
court reversed itself only eight months later, holding that a med-
ical education is neither community nor separate property.28 
While the Sullivan appeal was pending before the Califor-
nia Supreme Court,29 the state legislature resolved the issue by 
enacting AB 3000.30 The legislative history explicitly states what 
can readily be inferred31 from the statute: a professional educa-
"now our opinion" that "the starting premise [that is, the husband's degree is separate 
property) for the holding previously rendered is wrong." Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 799. 
25. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969) (neither 
husband's legal education nor his right to practice law was community property); In re 
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677-78 (1979), over-
ruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 
166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1980) (husband's legal education not community property). 
26. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2165 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 
1982), modified, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. Aug 2, 1982), aff'd and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 
762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). 
27. Id. at 2166. The court proposed three methods by which to value the commu-
nity's interest in a professional education, degree, or license to practice: 
Id. 
[1) [C)ompare the income of the holder of the professional 
license within a reasonable period after the acquisition of 
the license to the income of the same individual immedi-
ately before the acquisition. 
(2) [D)etermine the actual expenditure of community funds 
plus community hours to determine the amount of the 
community interest .... 
(3) [D)etermine the value of the loss of income to the com-
munity that resulted from one of the spouses attending 
professional school rather than being employed full time 
at a job for which such spouse was qualified without hav-
ing the benefit of the professional education. 
28. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd and 
rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). 
29. Rehearing granted Oct. 28, 1982. 
30. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1661, §§ 1-3. 
31. Although the statutes do not state whether a degree is property, Justice Mosk 
reviews the provisions and concludes: "The only issue raised . . . is whether acquired 
knowledge and education are a species of property subject to monetary division. The 
Legislature has now answered that question in the negative." In re Marriage of Sullivan, 
37 Cal. 3d 762, 770, 691 P.2d 1020, 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1984) (Mosk, J., con-
7
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tion, degree or license is not community property. "The Com-
mission does not believe that it would be either practical or fair 
to classify the value of the education, degree, or license, or the 
enhanced earning capacity, as community property and to divide 
the value upon marriage dissolution."s2 Before analyzing the 
provisions and discussing the effect of the new statute, the legis-
lature's conclusion that a degree is not property will be ex-
amined in context of California's community property laws and 
in light of the decisions in other equitable distribution and com-
munity property jurisdictions. 
B. Survey: Is a Professional Degree or Education Marital 
Property? 
Before an item can be characterized as marital or commu-
nity property for distribution on dissolution, it must first be ex-
amined to determine whether it conforms to the particular juris-
diction's definition of property.ss Traditional items of tangible 
property easily qualify as property and are readily characterized 
as marital or community property: real estate, furniture, and 
cars are common examples.s• A more difficult question is 
presented in the case of intangible items or interests. The over-
all trend in jurisdictions is to expand the earlier notions of prop-
erty to include intangibles.slI Generally, intangibles such as pen-
sion benefits,S6 professional practices,s7 and goodwillS8 have been 
recognized as property and, subsequently, community or marital 
property. Whether a professional degree or license to practice 
curring and dissenting). 
32. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 234. 
33. VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION, supra note 9, § 18.01, at 4. 
34. Id. § 18.02, at 13. 
35. Id. § 18.03 at 20. There are inconsistencies depending on the nature of the item 
in question and the idiosyncracies of the jurisdiction itself. Id. See generally id. §§ 18.01-
18.03 (discussing the definitional problem of "property," and summarizing the status of 
several intangible items currently being considered by courts as property). 
36. E.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 663 
(1976) (nonvested pension benefits were community property); Janssen v. Janssen, 331 
N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1983) (nonvested pension benefits were marital property). 
37. E.g., Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980) (the value of a medical 
practice at the time of dissolution was community property); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 339, 
331 A.2d 374 (1978) (husband's interest in his law partnership was marital property). 
38. E.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974) (hus-
band's goodwill in his law practice was community property); Dugan v. Dugan, 97 N.J. 
423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983) (goodwill in professional corporation of husband/attorney was 
marital property). 
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should fall within the expanding definition of property will be 
explored below. 
1. Majority View 
Eighteen of the twenty-six jurisdictions that have consid-
ered the issue have held that the student spouse's degree is not 
marital property.39 Four states have declined to rule specifically 
on the issue, but have allowed the degree to be considered in 
determining property distribution, maintenance, or some form of 
equitable reimbursement.4o The remaining jurisdictions have 
held that the degree is marital property subject to valuation and 
distribution upon dissolution.41 
39. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 340, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); 
Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); In re Marriage of 
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978); Zahler v. Zahler, 8 FAM. L. REP. 
(BNA) 2694, 2694 (Conn. Super. Ct., Aug. 5, 1982) (holding by implication); Wright v. 
Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 806 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) (holding by implication); Hughes v. 
Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 
Ill. App. 3d 234, __ , 470 N.E.2d 551, 559 (1984); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. 
App. 3d 1023, 1027-28, 423 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (1981) (future earning capacity flowing 
from husband's medical degree was not marital property); In re Marriage of McManama, 
272 Ind. 483, 487, 399 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1980) (future income flowing from husband's law 
degree was not marital property); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 890 
(Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982); Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 
733, 735 (N.H. 1983); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 495, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982); 
Muckelroy v. Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 15, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (1972); Hubbard v. Hub-
bard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979); Hodge v. Hodge, 486 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 
1984) (increased earning capacity flowing from husband's medical degree was not marital 
property); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D. 1984); Frausto v. 
Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 
814, 822 (Wyo. 1984). 
40. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981) (granted wife an 
equitable restitutionary award for educational costs and living expenses); Scott v. Scott, 
645 S.W.2d 193, 196-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (upheld lower court's $12,000 "property 
settlement" to wife); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 167-68, 428 N.E.2d 445, 448 
(1980) (ruled husband's medical degree as it affected his earning capacity was properly 
one element to be considered in awarding alimony); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 
2d 168, 178-79, 184, 677 P.2d 152, 158, 161 (1984) (reversed trial court for not consider-
ing the circumstances of the supporting spouse in either dividing property or awarding 
maintenance). 
41. Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193, 2194 (Mass. P. and Fam. Ct., Dec. 23, 
1981) (trial court); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 261-62, 337 N.W.2d 
332, 334 (1983) (by implication), contra Watling v. Watling, 127 Mich. App. 624, 627-28, 
339 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1983) (degree not marital property where the wife had shared in 
the benefits of the husband's degree for nineteen years and wife had her own advanced 
degree); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 237, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
Westchester County 1982), contra Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d 
935, 938 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (appellate court); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 
207-08,343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (1984) (by implication). 
9
Rhodes: Sullivan Revisited
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
536 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:527 
With the exception of Washington, which did not wish to 
address the "metaphysical question of whether a degree is prop-
erty,"42 four community property states4S were in the group of 
eighteen that found that a degree was not marital property. The 
courts in Arizona," California,411 and Texas46 reasoned that a de-
gree is not property at all as it is personal to the holder47 and 
cannot be assigned, transferred or conveyed.4s The New Mexico 
Supreme Court stated that a degree is not marital property as it 
is not susceptible to joint ownership.49 
2. Minority View 
A few states have recently held that a degree is marital 
property. This new approach may be attributable to two causes: 
1) a last resort to justify an award when the remedies of prop-
erty distribution, maintenance, or unjust enrichment awards 
were not available;IIO and 2) a recognition that restitutionary 
awards are not equitable in that they do not take into considera-
tion the benefit which a degree actually confers-increased earn-
ing power. III 
42. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 176,677 P.2d 152, 157 (1984). 
43. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 340, 641 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); 
Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); Muckelroy v. 
Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 15, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (1972); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 
656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). The remaining three community property states-Idaho, 
Louisiana, and Nevada-have not considered the issue. 
44. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). 
45. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969). 
46. Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). 
47. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134-35 (1969) (citing 
Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945». 
48. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 339-40, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); 
Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). 
49. Muckelroy v. Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 15, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (1972). 
50. In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, _, 470 N.E.2d 551, 559 
(1984). See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 207, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (1984) 
(no property to distribute, because the couple's income was used for education and living 
expenses); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 267, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 
(1983) (maintenance unavailable where the supporting spouse had demonstrated ability 
for self-support); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 176, 677 P.2d 152, 156-57 
(1984) (unjust enrichment award not appropriate where consideration of fault in a disso-
lution was prohibited). 
51. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983). 
See also Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179·80, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (1984) 
(restitution was only one of several factors a trial court must consider in compensating 
the supporting spouse for contributions to a professional education). 
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a. Wisconsin: A Professional Degree ,s Marital 
Property 
The broadest remedy to date was created last year by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court. In Haugan u. Haugan,62 the court 
concluded that " 'in a sense,' the degree 'is the most significant 
asset of the marriage' and 'it is only fair' that the supporting 
spouse be compensated for costs and opportunities foregone 
while the student spouse was in school."63 Noting that "compen-
sation may be accomplished under the statutes through mainte-
nance payments, property division, or both,"64 the court sug-
gested several approaches to value each spouse's contribution to 
the degree; a restitutionary "cost value" approach,66 an "oppor-
tunity cost" approach,66 an "enhanced earning capacity" ap-
proach,67 and a "labor theory" approach.68 The court stressed 
52. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). Patricia and 
Gordon Haugan were married on Aug. 4, 1973. Gordon attended medical school in South 
Dakota and Minnesota for four years, then pursued his residency in Chicago for three 
years. Patricia provided the sole support for the couple while Gordon was in medical 
school. Each made approximately equal contributions during Gordon's residency. The 
couple bought a house in Wisconsin early in 1980 and Patricia resigned her teaching 
position, anticipating that Gordon would soon complete his residency and begin his prac-
tice. However, the Haugans separated on May 13, 1980, two months before Gordon com-
pleted his residency. At the time of the dissolution, there were, in effect, no marital 
assets; the couple's liabilities ($126,176) exceeded their assets ($124,133). Id. at 202-04, 
343 N.W.2d at 798-99. 
53. Id. at 207, 343 N.W.2d at 800 (citing Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d I, 14, 
318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (1982». 
54. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 208, 343 N.W.2d at 800. 
55. Id. at 211, 343 N.W.2d at 802. The cost value approach calculates the value of 
the supporting spouse's contributions of money for education and living expenses, as well 
as homemaking services rendered during the marriage. Id. The wife introduced evidence 
that her contribution (not including homemaking services) under this approach was 
$13,000, or $28,500 indexed for inflation. Id. at 213, 343 N.W.2d at 803. 
56. Id. The opportunity cost approach calculates the value of the income sacrificed 
because the student spouse attended school rather than accepting employment. The wife 
introduced evidence that the husband's sacrificed income was $45,000, or $69,000 in-
dexed for inflation. Id. 
57. [d. The enhanced earning capacity approach calculates the present value of the 
student spouse's enhanced earning capacity flowing from his degree. The wife introduced 
evidence that one half interest under this theory was $133,000. [d. at 213-14,343 N.W.2d 
at 803. 
58. Id. at 214, 343 N.W.2d at 803. The modified labor theory approach calculates 
the value of the supporting spouse's contribution at one half of the student spouse's 
enhanced yearly earning power for as many years as the supporting spouse worked to 
support the student. The court estimated the wife's contribution under this theory was 
$45,500. [d. See generally Mullenix, The Valuation of an Educational Degree at Di-
vorce, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 227, 274-83 (1983) (labor theory introduced as a basis for a 
proposal to value a professional degree). The theory, as originally proposed, would award 
11
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that the approaches suggested were not exclusive and advised 
the trial courts: "Each case must be decided on its own facts. 
The guiding principles for the trial court are fairness and 
justice. "119 
b. Michigan: A Professional Degree £s Marital 
Property . . . Sometimes 
In Woodworth u. Woodworth,60 the Court of Appeals of 
Michigan, an equitable distribution state, held that a law degree 
is marital property subject to distribution.61 The court rejected 
an alimony award as too tenuous and most likely unavailable.62 
The court similarly rejected restitution as an "inadequate" rem-
edy under the circumstances of the case: "[t]reating the .degree 
as such a gift [instead of an investment] would unjustly enrich 
the degree holder to the extent that the degree's value exceeds 
its COSt."6S The court also declined to rule specifically whether 
the degree is "property" per se; that issue being "beside the 
point."6. The focus of the court should be, instead, "on the most 
equitable solution to dissolving the marriage and dividing among 
the respective parties what they have."611 
The scope of the Woodworth decision was narrowed only 
two months later when the same court ruled in Watling u. 
the supporting spouse "fifty percent of the professional spouse's actual income, for the 
same period of time it took for that spouse to acquire the degree or license." [d. at 279 
(footnote omitted). The variation adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court differs from 
the original proposal in that it allows only for the enhanced yearly earning power, not 
the total yearly earning power, of the student spouse to be included in the calculation. 
Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 214, 343 N.W.2d at 803. 
59. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 214, 343 N.W.2d at 803. 
60. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983). Michael 
and Ann Woodworth were married in 1970, separated in 1980, and were divorced in 1982. 
Michael attended law school from 1973 to 1976, and thereafter passed the bar exam. Ann 
worked in various positions for the first seven years of their marriage. [d. at 259-60, 337 
N.W.2d at 333. The court did not indicate the source from which Michael's education 
was funded, and it did not describe the assets, if any, owned by the couple. 
61. [d. at 261-62, 337 N.W.2d at 334. 
62. [d. at 267, 337 N.W.2d at 337. 
63. [d. at 268, 337 N.W.2d at 337. 
64. [d. at 263, 337 N.W.2d at 335. 
65. [d. The court noted that the trial court had valued Michael's degree at $20,000, 
but had not described how that value was reached. The appellate court remanded the 
case to the trial court to revalue the degree based on three factors: 1) the length of the 
marriage after the degree was obtained, 2) the sources and extent of the student spouse's 
support, and 3) the overall division of marital property. [d. at 269, 337 N.W.2d at 337. 
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Watling66 that a wife was not entitled to a portion of the value 
of her husband's dental degree upon divorce.67 The court reiter-
ated its stated policy of seeking an equitable solution under the 
facts of each case.68 The court noted four facts which it believed 
justified the trial court's denial to the wife of an interest in her 
spouse's degree: 1) the wife also had an advanced degree to 
which the husband had reciprocally contributed; 2) the wife had 
already been compensated as she shared in the benefits of the 
degree for nineteen years; 3) the husband's current salary was to 
a large extent a result of his experience and work since he ac-
quired his degree; and 4) the wife supported the husband in 
school for one year only.69 
c. Washington: The Professional Degree as a 
Factor 
In Washburn u. Washburn,70 the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington held that in dividing property and awarding mainte-
nance, a relevant and necessary factor was that a community has 
not realized the benefits from the earning potential of a degree 
which was financed by the supporting spouse.71 Although Wash-
ington is technically a community property state, its statutes 
mandate equitable distribution of property.72 The Washburn 
66. Watling v. Watling, 127 Mich. App. 624, 339 N.W.2d 505 (1983). Charles and 
Sally Watling were married in June, 1960. Charles completed dental school one year af-
ter the marriage. Sally provided for the couple's living expenses for that year, but did not 
contribute any money for educational expenses. The couple separated in 1980, nearly 
twenty years after they were married. Sally received her master of science degree in edu-
cation eleven months later. [d. at 625, 339 N.W.2d at 506. 
67. [d. at 627, 339 N.W.2d at 507. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. at 627-28, 339 N.W.2d at 507. 
70. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984). Marigail and 
Gerald Washburn were married in 1971 while both were juniors in undergraduate school. 
Gerald attended veterinary school from 1974 through 1978, while Marigail supported the 
couple by working full time. After completing a one year internship after graduation 
from veterinary school, Gerald began practice as a veterinarian in 1979. One and a half 
years later the couple separated, and were divorced shortly thereafter. There were practi-
cally no marital assets. [d. at 170-71, 677 P.2d at 154. 
71. [d. at 178, 677 P.2d at 158. One justice dissented, claiming that considering 
earning capacity as a factor was inadequate, and stated: "I would characterize this inter-
est as a marital asset in the context of increased earning capacity subject to distribu-
tion." [d. at 184, 677 P.2d at 161 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). 
72. [d. at 176-77,677 P.2d at 157 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1974) which 
states, in part: "[I]n a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution ... , 
the court shall . . . make such disposition of the property and liabilities of the parties, 
13
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court did not consider the "metaphysical" question of whether a 
degree is property.73 Rather, the court relied on its "broad dis-
cretionary power"" to distribute property and award mainte-
nance by considering the economic circumstances of each 
party.711 The court rejected unjust enrichment as a remedy not 
because it was inadequate,76 but because determining whether 
an enrichment was unjust would require statutorily prohibited 
inquiry into fault within the marriage." Accordingly, the Wash-
burn court characterized the trial court's "restitutionary" award 
as maintenance.78 
C. Failure to Characterize as Property Does Not Bar 
Relief 
The failure of most courts to characterize a degree as prop-
erty or marital property has not necessarily controlled the result. 
There is general agreement that the supporting spouse is enti-
tled to some form of relief, in spite of the apparent divergence in 
the decisions from state to state on whether a degree is marital 
property.79 There is a developing majority consensus which per-
either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all 
relevant factors ... "). 
73. Id. at 176, 677 P.2d at 157. 
74. Id. at 179, 677 P.2d at 158. 
75. Id. at 179-80, 677 P.2d at 159. The court directed the trial court to consider four 
factors, among others, in determining a proper amount of compensation for the support-
ing spouse by means of property division and maintenance: 1) the amount of community 
funds expended for direct educational cost; 2) the foregone earnings of the student 
spouse; 3) any career opportunity given up by the supporting spouse; and 4) the future 
earning prospects of each spouse, including the enhanced earning potential of the stu-
dent spouse. Id. 
76. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983). 
77. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 176, 677 P.2d at 156-57. 
78. Id. at 182, 677 P.2d at 160. 
79. Sixteen of the eighteen jurisdictions that have held a professional degree is not 
property (see supra note 39) have allowed for relief in varying forms. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. 
Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 354, 661 P.2d 196, 204 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (restitutionary award 
was appropriate to prevent unjust enrichment); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 
3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (1979) (wife had realized value of husband's degree 
through other assets, the product of his degree, awarded to her in the property division; 
husband's earning capacity was considered in awarding spousal and child support); In re 
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 433, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (court may consider 
contribution to an education in dividing marital property, or in awarding maintenance 
when a need had been demonstrated); Zahler v. Zahler, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2694, 2695 
(Conn. Super. Ct., Aug. 5, 1982) (wife awarded lump-sum alimony); Hughes v. Hughes, 
438 So. 2d 146, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (court should consider husband's education 
in dividing other assets equitably and determining the propriety and/or amount of con-
ventional alimony); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, __ , 470 N.E.2d 
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mits compensation on three alternative grounds: (1) distribution 
of marital assets and liabilities, (2) some form of maintenance or 
alimony, or (3) an equitable monetary award to the supporting 
spouse based on unjust enrichment or some other equitable 
principle.80 
The first alternative has been applied in most of the equita-
ble distribution states, whose statutes include the relative earn-
ing capacity of the parties as a factor to be considered in distrib-
uting marital property.81 Thus, even though a court may find 
that a degree does not qualify as marital property, it has the 
power to look to the concomitant earning potential of the de-
gree, recognize that this asset must follow the degree holder and 
offset the degree's potential value by awarding other assets to 
the supporting spouse. This is usually the approach taken when 
551,559-60 (1984) (degree was a relevant factor in distributing other marital property, or 
granting maintenance; a trial court also possesses inherent equitable authority to grant 
an award to prevent unjust enrichment); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 666, 365 
N.E.2d 792, 796 (1977) (no abuse of discretion by trial court in awarding the wife sub-
stantially all the marital assets); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 
(Iowa 1978) (court may consider the future earning capacity of the student spouse in 
distributing assets and in determining the propriety and amount of alimony); Inman v. 
Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982) (dictum: would allow recovery for the costs of the 
education and living expenses, and the potential for increase in future earnings made 
possible by the degree); Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 734 (N.H. 1983) (contributions of 
a supporting spouse toward a degree may be considered in allocating property); Mahoney 
v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 502-04, 453 A.2d 527, 535-37 (1982) (compensation was allowa· 
ble by reimbursement alimony, rehabilitative alimony, conventional alimony or through 
equitable distribution of marital assets); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751-52 
(Okla. 1979) (cash award in lieu of property settlement required to prevent unjust en· 
richment; under proper circumstances, marital assets could be divided to work equity); 
Hodge v. Hodge, 486 A.2d 951, 953-54 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1984) (trial court properly consid· 
ered wife's contributions to education in awarding alimony); Saint· Pierre v. Saint· Pierre, 
357 N.W.2d 250, 262 (S.D. 1984) (reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony may be 
awarded to compensate supporting spouse); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (court had wide discretion in dividing property and may consider 
the differences in earning capacity, education and ability of the parties); Grosskopf v. 
Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822-23 (Wyo. 1984) (upheld disproportionate distribution of 
property in wife's favor; indicated that where there was no marital property to divide, a 
restitutionary award would be equitable). 
80. In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, __ , 470 N.E.2d 551, 557 
(1984). See infra notes 82-88. 
81. See Note, Property Division and Alimony Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limi· 
tations on Judicial Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 439 n.170 (1981) for a list of 
factors included in property distribution statutes and the frequency of the use of each 
factor. The most frequently used factor is the economic circumstances of the parties 
including the amount and sources of income; the sixth most frequently used factor is the 
occupation and vocational skills of the parties. Id. 
15
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the couple has accumulated substantial marital assets as a result 
of the earnings of the professional spouse.82 
If earning capacity is not a factor in property distribution 
statutes, it is often a factor in maintenance or alimony stat-
utes.8S The second alternative, then, allows for a monetary 
award to the supporting spouse in alimony or maintenance in 
lieu of or in addition to the property distribution8• to offset ei-
ther the cost of the degree or the increased earning power of the 
student spouse. 811 The goal of the first two alternatives, property 
distribution and alimony awards, is to offset the value of the de-
gree. They differ significantly in that property distribution ac-
complishes the offset with existing property, while alimony or 
maintenance awards are generally paid by the student spouse 
with income earned in the future. 
The third alternative allows a separate monetary award to 
be made to the supporting spouse as compensation for the stu-
dent spouse's educational costs and living expenses.86 The award 
is usually based on a theory of unjust enrichment and is adopted 
82. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 662, 365 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1977) 
(wife awarded all the marital assets, which were valued at $42,000); In re Marriage of 
Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (wife awarded "many of the parties' 
personal assets," and husband awarded his law degree, the only income-producing asset); 
Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (wife received 79.4% of the 
marital assets); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 823 (wife awarded over $36,000 in 
cash, and husband obligated with $8,000 in debts). 
83. See Note, supra note 81, at 428 n.96. Sixteen of the thirty states that list specific 
factors include the earning capacity of each party as a factor. Id. 
84. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 504, 453 A.2d 527, 535-36 (1982) 
(allowed reimbursement alimony only if there are no substantial marital assets to di-
vide); Sa'int-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 260. 262 (S.D. 1984) (judicially cre-
ated remedy of reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony was allowed, notwithstanding a 
division of marital assets); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179,677 P.2d 152, 
158 (1984) (maintenance may be awarded in lieu of or in addition to a property 
settlement). 
85. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 504, 453 A.2d 527, 536 (1982) (de-
gree holder's earning capacity may be considered in awarding conventional alimony); 
Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 260 (S.D. 1984) (supporting spouse may be 
compensated for contributions to the education and the enhanced earning capacity flow-
ing therefrom); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179-80, 677 P.2d 152, 159 
(1984) (supporting spouse may be compensated for educational costs and the earning 
potential of the student spouse). 
86. In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, __ , 470, N.E.2d 551, 558 
(1984). See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard 
v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1979); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 823 
(Wyo. 1984). 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/3
1985] SULLIVAN REVISITED 543 
when the first two alternatives are either not available87 or 
would not produce an equitable distribution.88 
The courts in equitable distribution jurisdictions have con-
siderable leeway in characterizing and valuing marital assets. 
Three available options are to offset the value of a degree with 
either other marital assets or by maintenance awards, or grant a 
separate money award grounded in equity. In those few jurisdic-
tions which have recently held a degree to be marital property,89 
the courts retain flexibility to characterize a degree as marital 
property subject to division in one case and, in the next, not 
consider the degree at all. 90 When the case requires a valuation 
of the degree, the courts are free to arrive at a value which will 
produce an equitable result, whether the purpose in determining 
value is to offset other assets or maintenance awards, fashion an 
equitable monetary award or openly distribute a degree as prop-
erty. The aggregate results of the cases indicate that the rule is 
not "equitable distribution," but rather "equitable characteriza-
tion"91 or "equitable valuation,"92 depending on the require-
87. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. 1981) (no mari-
tal assets to divide, and wife was self-supporting and therefore not entitled to mainte-
nance); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822-23 (Wyo. 1984) (equitable relief for 
the cost of the degree may be appropriate in cases where there are no marital assets). 
88. See, e.g, Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1979) (marital property 
was "insubstantial"); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 823 (Wyo. 1984) (equitable 
relief may be proper in cases presenting the two extremes of no marital property and 
substantial marital property). 
89. E.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983); 
Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). 
90. "One court, spurred by equitable concerns, has gone so far as to find that a 
professional degree falls within the traditional definition of property only in those cases 
where divorce occurs early in the marriage, and there is little acquired property." Recent 
Developments, supra note 13, at 214. 
91. See, e.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 259-62, 337 N.W.2d 
332, 333-34 (1983) (a Michigan appellate court held the degree was marital property 
where marriage lasted only five years after husband earned the degree). But see Watling 
v. Watling, 127 Mich. App. 624, 627-28, 339 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1983) (same court held 
degree was not marital property in light of circumstances of parties: parties married only 
one year while husband in dental school; wife had shared in benefits of degree for 20 
years; wife had own advanced degree; and, husband's current income was due more to his 
experience acquired during practice rather than to what he learned during education). 
Compare Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (a Kentucky 
appellate court held a degree was marital property but only in "certain circumstances:" 
little or no marital property accumulated whose division would work equity; no recipro-
cal aid in helping other spouse obtain a degree; marriage was short and therefore non-
license holder had not benefited financially from the professional spouse's earning capac-
ity) with Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (same court held a 
17
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ments of the case. 
D. The Results in Other Jurisdictions Justify the Califor-
nia Position 
California courts do not have the flexibility demonstrated 
by courts in equitable jurisdiction and hybrid community prop-
erty/equitable distribution jurisdictions to look at all the cir-
cumstances of the parties to determine what would be a fair 
property division and then characterize and value assets accord-
ingly. Unlike Wisconsin,98 Michigan,94 and Washington,911 char-
acterization of an asset is the decisive issue in California prop-
erty division: if an asset is community property, it is 
automatically subject to valuation and equal distribution;96 if it 
medical degree and license to practice were not property, and explained that an equita-
ble result was able to be reached where there were no substantial marital assets yet the 
wife was found to be eligible for maintenance and was also awarded $10,000 in the form 
of lump sum maintenance as compensation for her contribution to the husband's 
education). 
The Kentucky Supreme Court later resolved the issue by holding, in Inman v. In-
man, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982) [hereinafter, Inman Il), that a degree was not marital 
property. Id. at 852. In dictum, however, the court allowed for compensation under the 
Kentucky property division statute to the wife based on educational costs, living ex-
penses, and the "potential for increase in future earning capacity made possible by the 
degree." Id. But see McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), in 
which a Kentucky appellate court would not adhere to the dictum set forth in Inman II 
that a spouse who had worked and financially contributed to the other spouse's acquisi-
tion of a professional degree should automatically receive a monetary award based on a 
prescribed formula. Id. at 223. 
92. E.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held a degree was a marital asset and proposed four approaches (see 
supra notes 55-58) to value the supporting spouse's contribution. Id. at 800, 802-03. The 
court instructed the trial courts to exercise their "broad discretion" in rendering a fun-
damentally fair and equitable decision in each case, based on its facts. Id. at 802. Apply-
ing the court's suggested formulas, the trial court could have awarded the wife from 
$28,560 to $133,000: $28,560 for "cost value;" $69,800 for "opportunity costs;" $133,000 
for "enhanced earning capacity;" or $45,500 for "labor theory." Id at 802-03. 
Compare In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978) (Supreme 
Court of Iowa held that the enhanced earning capacity was marital property and upheld 
the trial court's award of $18,000 to the wife as a "property distribution," where there 
were no other marital assets, and $18,000 was found to approximate the cost of the edu-
cation) with In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280-81 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (an 
Iowa appellate court upheld as equitable the trial court's property division in which the 
family home, subject to existing indebtedness, as well as "many of the parties' personal 
assets" were awarded to the wife, and the husband was awarded his law degree). 
93. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. 
96. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). "[TJhe court shall ... 
divide the community property and the quasi-community property of the parties 
18
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is separate property or not legally defined as property, it is not 
subject to division. S7 Thus, if a precedent were set that a degree 
or its concomitant earning capacity was community property, it 
would necessarily have to be so in all subsequent cases, regard-
less of the circumstances. 
While the case law of other jurisdictions has only limited 
applicability in California, the experience of those courts sup-
port the position of the legislature not to characterize a degree 
and the enhanced earning capacity of its holder as community 
property. One of the fundamental concepts of the statutes in eq-
uitable distribution as well as community property states is that 
all property acquired-including income earned-after divorce 
or separation is the separate property of the parties.ss Awards 
based on future earnings are contrary to the spirit of the stat-
utes.SS The reluctance of the equitable distribution jurisdictions 
to contradict this basic principle by placing a value on future 
earnings is evident in their choice of remedies as well as the 
amount of their awards. In the cases in which there are no sub-
stantial marital assets, courts making lump sum alimony awards 
rarely value the degree over $20,000.100 Many courts choose 
awards of reimbursement or restitution for costs incurred, thus 
not valuing the future earnings at al1.101 There remain, also, 
equally." Id. 
97. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). "Except as provided in 
Sections 5107 [wife's separate property], 5108 [husband's separate property], and 5126 
[personal injury damage awards], all real property situated in this state and ali personal 
property ... is community property .... " Id. 
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5118, 5119 (West 1983) (earnings and accumulations 
of a spouse while living separate from the other spouse, or after a judgment decreeing 
legal separation, are the separate property of the earning spouse); Marriage & Dissolu-
tion Act § 503, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)(3), (b) (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1983) 
(property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation is "non-marital" 
property; but property acquired between the time when spouses are living separately and 
when a judgment of dissolution is entered is presumed to be "marital property"). 
99. Herring, supra note 12, at 87. 
100. See, e.g., Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (upheld 
trial court's award of $10,000 in lump sum maintenance); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 
693,695,264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978) (trial court's award of $15,000 alimony in gross "fairly 
represents the wife's contribution to the acquisition" of the husband's degree); Scott v. 
Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193, 196-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (upheld trial court's "property settle-
ment" in the amount of $12,000, citing with favor other courts' use of lump sum alimony 
awards to compensate the supporting spouse); Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773, 775 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (trial court correct to consider husband's medical education in 
awarding $24,000 alimony to wife). 
101. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981) (awarded 
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those courts which deny any relief and do not value either the 
degree or the future earnings of its holder. The equitable distri-
bution system has been criticized for producing both inconsis-
tent, unpredictable results and promoting judge or forum shop-
ping. l02 "[M]any courts have failed to recognize that once a 
degree is deemed property, it must be treated as property in all 
cases to avoid ... 'doctrinal chaos' .... "103 
The resistance to valuing and distributing future earnings 
would be greater in California, where the courts have no flexibil-
ity to award other than one-half of the value of the degree to the 
supporting spouse. lO", Forced to value and distribute future earn-
ings of a degree, courts could conceivably circumvent the equal 
division requirement by undervaluing the degree in appropriate 
circumstances, producing, however, the undesirable consequence 
of injecting an "equitable valuation" facet into California's com-
munity property system despite the equal distribution require-
ment. The end result would be a situation similar to that of 
equitable distribution jurisdictions: inconsistent and unpredict-
able awards, supported by rationales and justifications which 
camouflage the true basis for the awards. 
E. The "Goodwill" Analogy 
There is an inherent conflict between awards based on fu-
ture earning capacity and the statutory directive that future 
earnings are separate property. California courts have con-
fronted this dilemma in the context of cases involving good-
will. lOIi Because the value of goodwill is the present value of ex-
wife restitutionary award of $11,400 representing living costs and direct educational ex-
penses); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1979) (to prevent unjust enrich-
ment, wife should be awarded, on remand, the amount of her contributions toward hus-
band's "direct support and school and professional training expenses, plus reasonable 
interest and adjustment for inflation"); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822-23 
(Wyo. 1984) (court suggested an equitable award to the supporting spouse which would 
afford an opportunity to obtain the same degree as the student spouse, or in the alterna-
tive, a sum of money equal to that benefit). 
102. Herring, supra note 12, at 87. 
103. Recent Developments, supra note 13, at 214 (footnote omitted). 
104. Bruch, The Definition and Division of Marital Property in California: To-
wards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 854 (1982). 
105. Goodwill is that intangible asset of a business or professional practice repre-
senting the value of the business, above and beyond its inventory and accounts receiva-
ble, which is the product of its clientele and reputation. [d. at 810. 
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pected future patronage based on past performance,106 the 
danger exists that any award may reach future earnings of the 
professional spouse. 
California courts have frequently considered goodwill valua-
tion questions in recent years,107 but arrived at "alarmingly dis-
parate valuations of practices that would at least appear simi-
lar."108 Some commentators dismiss this fluctuation as judicial 
"confusion."109 The variations are more probably due to resis-
tance by courts to valuing and distributing what is, in effect, fu-
ture earnings. 110 
If the variations in goodwill cases are due to resistance by 
California courts to valuing the future earnings of a business, 
these courts are likely to more strongly resist valuing future in-
come from a degree. When valuing goodwill the court is at least 
basing its calculations on past results. Proponents of character-
izing a degree as property assert that a degree is analogous to 
goodwill insofar as the value of the degree rests in the expecta-
tion of future income resulting from the skills acquired by past 
efforts. In the case of a degree, however, there is no evidence of 
past earnings by which to predict the future earnings. The only 
solution would be for the court to look at how well the profes-
106. In re Marriage of Rives, 130 Cal. App. 3d 138, 149-50, 181 Cal. Rptr. 572, 577-
78 (1982) (error to value the goodwill of queen bee business on a "potential income 
approach"). 
107. Bruch, supra note 104, at 810. 
108. Id. at 810 n.159, citing Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 
(1969) ("law practice's goodwill valued at $1,000 when annual net income was $23,412"); 
Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969) ("medical practice's 
goodwill valued at $32,500 when net annual income was approximately $45,000"). 
109. Bruch, supra note 104, at 810. See also Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Mari-
tal Dissolution: Is it Property or Another Name for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 27, 27 
(1977) (addressing the "growing confusion" in valuing professional goodwill). 
110. One appellate court allowed goodwill but warned that the value of professional 
goodwill "should be determined with considerable care and caution, since it is a unique 
situation in which the continuing practitioner is judicially forced to buy an intangible 
asset at a judicially determined value and compelled to pay a former spouse her share 
in tangible assets." In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 
68 (3d Dist. 1974) (emphasis in original). Other courts have been more adamant, stating 
that because it is impermissible to classify post-separation earnings as community prop-
erty, the value of goodwill must be established without reference to the potential or con-
tinuing net income of the professional practitioner. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rives, 130 
Cal. App. 3d 138, 150, 181 Cal. Rptr. 572, 578 (3d Dist. 1982); In re Marriage of Foster, 
42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 582, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (lst Dist. 1974); In re Marriage of Fortier, 
34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (2d Dist. 1973). 
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sional did in school, and attempt to extrapolate success in prac-
tice. These calculations are completely speculative whereas valu-
ations of goodwill are grounded in fact. 
Some courts which have held a degree to be marital prop-
erty point out that precisely this type of speculative calculation 
is used in wrongful death and personal injury cases. lll In wrong-
ful death and personal injury cases, however, fault has been as-
signed to a tortfeasor or wrongdoer. The "cost" of the damage 
has been delegated to the tortfeasor as a matter of public policy; 
it is more fair to speculate as to damages than not to compen-
sate the aggrieved party at a11.112 Under California law, there is 
no consideration of fault in a dissolution proceeding; there are 
no victims, no tortfeasors. If the rationale of fault for holding 
the tortfeasor liable to the injured party does not exist in disso-
lution cases, there is likewise no basis to speculate as to feature 
earnings. 
F. The "Pension Benefits" Analogy 
Several commentators1l3 have suggested that, in addition to 
goodwill, the recognition of unvested pension benefits as divisi-
ble community property114 is precedent for the proposition that 
a degree and the future earnings it may generate are community 
property. However, the future earnings of a degree as an asset 
are distinguishable from future benefits as an asset. "[P]ension 
benefits represent a form of deferred compensation for services 
rendered .... "lU At the time of separation, the spouse who is 
not the named beneficiary of the pension is entitled to a share of 
the pension equal to the proportion of the length of the marriage 
to the total number of years required to obtain the pension. 
111. E.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 266·67, 337 N.W.2d 332, 
336 (1983). 
112. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 4, 121 (3d ed. 1964). 
113. E.g., Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protec· 
tion for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 412 (1980); 
Mullenix, supra note 58, at 254·56. 
114. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 
(1976). Robert Brown had accumulated, during the 24 year marriage, 72 of 78 "points" 
required by his employer's pension plan to qualify for benefits. He needed to work only 
three more years to acquire the remaining six points. The trial court had held that be-
cause Robert's rights in the retirement pension had not yet vested, the value of the bene-
tits were not community property. Id. at 841-44, 544 P.2d at 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 
634-35. 
115. Id. at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637. 
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Whatever that proportion is, all the work from which the bene-
fits are derived has already been completed. The asset owned at 
this point by the community is a guaranteed fixed amount in the 
future. liS In contradistinction, a degree is valueless unless used; 
to make use of the degree, its holder must work to derive the 
income. There is no deferred compensation granted to a person 
merely because he or she holds a degree. 
G. The Student Spouse 
Finally, the position of the professional spouse is often over-
looked in the debate of whether to characterize a degree as com-
munity property. Valuing the future earnings of a degree holder 
would create an unjust burden on the professional spouse. ll7 
The method often suggested is to predict the lifetime earnings of 
the professional spouse, subtract from it the earnings that 
spouse probably would have earned without the degree, and 
award half of the resulting sum to the other spouse. liS Consider 
the implications and gross inequity of this solution; in exchange 
for three to seven years of support,1I9 a potentially large debt is 
assigned to the professional spouse based on speculation as to 
what an "average" professional might earn. As the degrees cur-
rently at issue often yield higher than average salaries, the pro-
fessional would not only be compelled to maintain the projected 
standard imposed upon him or her, but would have to do so for 
life. If he or she chose to change careers, starting in a lower in-
come position would exacerbate his or her debt. In short, making 
this determination at the outset of a career would effectively 
lock the professional in that career for his or her life. This comes 
116. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 846, 544 P.2d 561, 565, 126 
Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1976) (quoting Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 855,179 
P.2d 799, 803 (1947)); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, _, 470 
N.E.2d 551, 565 (1984). The non-beneficiary spouse has a one-half community interest in 
this asset. 
117. [TJo give the working spouse an interest in half the student 
spouse's increased earnings for the remainder to the student 
spouse's life because of the relatively brief period of education 
and training received during marriage is not only a windfall to 
the working spouse but in effect a permanent mortgage on the 
student spouse's future. 
Recommendation, supra note 23, at 234. 
118. E.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 213, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984); 
Bruch, supra note 104, at 817 n.190. 
119. A student spouse might require three years of support to acquire a law degree, 
or four to seven years of support to acquire a medical degree and training. 
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dangerously close to an infringement on the constitutional pro-
hibition on involuntary servitude. 
H. The Legislature's Decision was Sound 
The California Legislature acted wisely not to characterize a 
degree or the enhanced earning capacity which results from a 
degree as community property, attempt to value this asset and 
then divide it equally. Although this solution has been adopted 
by a few courts in equitable distribution jurisdictions, the Cali-
fornia courts do not have the leeway of those courts to vary the 
value of the degree to fit the equities called for by the facts of 
individual cases. Regardless, it is contrary to established princi-
ples of community property to award the future earnings of one 
spouse to the other, except in the case of alimony. The under-
lying principle of the community property system is that prop-
erty acquired after separation is the separate property of each 
spouse. 
Although the statutory concept of property has been ex-
panded by case law to define as community property such intan-
gible items as pension benefits and goodwill, the earning capa-
city of a degree should not be included within this expansion. 
Future earnings are distinguishable from future benefits. Good-
will cases should likewise not be cited as precedent for the the-
ory that future earnings from a degree may be valued and dis-
tributed. The goodwill exception is contrary to community 
property principles. The cases involving goodwill have produced 
a wide disparity in judgments, indicating theoretical and practi-
cal weaknesses. One mistake does not justify the adoption of an-
other. Last, but certainly not least, it is unfair to the profes-
sional spouse to grant the working spouse an interest in his or 
her future earnings. As the legislature has recognized, there are 
better alternatives which are fair to both spouses. 
III. AB 3000: REIMBURSEMENT FOR EDUCATIONAL 
COSTS 
In adopting AB 3000120 the legislature believed it had 
120. AB 3000 added § 4800.3 to the California Civil Code (1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1661, § 
2) and amended § 4801 of the California Civil Code (1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1661, § 3). Sec-
tion 4800.3 of the California Civil Code states: 
(a) As used in this section, "community contributions to edu-
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/3
1985] SULLIVAN REVISITED 
cation or training" means payments made with community 
property for education or training or for the repayment of a 
loan incurred for education or training. 
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in this section, upon 
dissolution of marriage or legal separation: 
(1) The community shall be reimbursed for community contri-
butions to education or training of a party that substantially 
enhances the earning capacity of the party. The amount reim-
bursed shall be with interest at the legal rate, accruing from 
the end of the calendar year in which the contributions were 
made. 
(2) A loan incurred during marriage for the education or train-
ing of a party shall not be included among the liabilities of the 
community for the purpose of division pursuant to Section 
4800 but shall be assigned for payment by the party. 
(c) The reimbursement and assignment required by this sec-
tion shall be reduced or modified to the extent circumstances 
render such a disposition unjust, including but not limited to 
any of the following: 
(1) The community has substantially benefited from the edu-
cation, training, or loan incurred for the education or training 
of the party. There is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the 
burden of proof, that the community has not substantially 
benefited from community contributions to the education or 
training made less than 10 years before the commencement of 
the proceeding, and that the community has substantially 
benefited from community contributions to the education or 
training made more than 10 years before the commencement 
of the proceeding. 
(2) The education or training received by the party is offset by 
the education or training received by the other party for which 
community contributions have been made. 
(3) The education or training enables the party receiving the 
education or training to engage in gainful employment that 
substantially reduces the need of the party for support that 
would otherwise be required. 
(d) Reimbursement for community contributions and assign-
ment of loans pursuant to this section is the exclusive remedy 
of the community or a party for the education or training and 
any resulting enhancement of the earning capacity of a party. 
However, nothing in this subdivision shall limit consideration 
of the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the 
amount reimbursed pursuant to this section, on the circum-
stances of the parties for the purpose of an order for support 
pursuant to Section 4801. 
(e) This section is subject to an express written agreement of 
the parties to the contrary. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985). 
Section 4801 of the California Civil Code provides in pertinent part: 
(a) In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a marriage or 
a legal separation of the parties, the court may order a party 
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found an "equitable solution"12l to the Sullivan problem. The 
new legislation essentially grants relief in three ways: 1) it adds 
section 4800.3 to the Civil Code to allow for reimbursement to 
the community for community contributions to the education of 
one of the parties, subject to several conditions; 2) it allows for 
educational loans to be assigned to the party receiving the edu-
cation;122 and 3) it amends section 4801(a)(1) of the Civil Code 
governing spousal support to allow for consideration, with re-
spect to each spouse's earning capacity, of the extent to which 
the "supported spouse"128 contributed to the education or train-
ing of the professional spouse. The particular aspects and the 
underlying legislative intent of each of these provisions will be 
discussed in full below.124 
The legislature selected reimbursement as a practical com-
promise to the various suggested solutions to the Sullivan prob-
lem.l2II The Law Review Commission (hereinafter, "the Commis-
any period of time, as the court may deem just and reasona-
ble. In making the award, the court shall consider all of the 
following circumstances of the respective parties: 
(1) The earning capacity of each spouse, taking into account 
the extent to which the supported spouse's present and future 
earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that 
were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported 
spouse to devote time to domestic duties and the extent to 
which the supported spouse contributed to the attainment of 
an education, training, or a license by the other spouse. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). 
121. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 235. The legislature originally proposed 
Assembly Bill 525. AB 525 (1983-84). AB 525 would have granted the supporting spouse 
a percentage of the professional spouse's future income-the percentage to be calculated 
based on the spouse's proportionate contribution to the acquisition of the degree. The 
bill was sharply criticized as being directly contrary to the principle that post-separation 
earnings are separate property and as unconstitutionally imposing involuntary servitude 
on the professional spouse. Community Property Issues Presented in Sullivan v. Sulli-
van: Hearings on AB 525 Before the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 93, 133-34 
(1983) (testimony of Kathleen A. Eggleston, representing American Futurists for the Ed-
ucation of Women). 
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(2) (West Supp. 1985) (replacing CAL. CIV. CODE § 
4800(b)(4) (1978». See supra note 120 for the text of the statute. 
123. Note that "supported spouse," as used in the code, refers to the spouse eligible 
for spousal support, who has been referred to throughout this Comment as the "support-
ing spouse." 
124. Because the Law Revision Commission published no comments on § 4801(a)(l) 
of the California Civil Code and the change is minor, this provision will be discussed in 
context of the supreme court's decision in In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 
P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). See infra notes 172-98 and accompanying text. 
125. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 233-35. 
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sion") did not believe it either fair or practical to classify the 
value of an education, degree, license or the resulting enhanced 
earning capacity as community property.126 They rejected the 
"plain inequity" of denying any relief to the working spouse.127 
The Commission also deemed it inadvisable to disrupt the es-
tablished scheme of spousal support to remedy the discrepancy 
in the earning capacities of the parties.126 
A. The Statutory Provisions 
The heart of the legislation is California Civil Code section 
4800.3(b)(1), which states that a community shall be reimbursed 
for community contributions to the education of a party that 
substantially enhances the earning capacity of that party. The 
rationale for reimbursement is that it puts the parties on "equal 
footing" by giving the "working spouse the same amount the 
student spouse was given for the education."129 While "commu-
nity contributions" are ambiguously referred to as "payments" 
in subdivision (a), the Commission has defined them as "money 
actually contributed for payment of tuition, fees, books, sup-
plies, etc."lSO Furthermore, the contribution must "substantially 
enhance" the student spouse's earning capacity. If the enhance-
ment is only marginal, there is no right to reimbursement be-
cause the basis of that right, the community contributed funds 
for the economic benefit of the student spouse, fails. lSI On the 
other hand, if the enhancement is substantial, the interest of the 
supporting spouse is protected because reimbursement is re-
quired regardless of whether the student spouse utilizes his or 
her enhanced earning capacity.ls2 
California Civil Code section 4800.3(b)(2) assigns to the 
126. [d. at 234. 
127. [d. at 233. 
128. [d. at 234. 
129. [d. at 235. 
130. [d. at 235 n.7. Note that the student spouse's contributions of time and effort 
are not included as a community expenditure. See also infra notes 145-54 and accompa-
nying text for critique of statute. 
131. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 235. The more appropriate basis is that the 
community contributed funds for the economic benefit of the community, not the stu-
dent spouse. See Krauskopf, supra note 113, at 386-88. 
132. The student spouse may not utilize his or her training in two situations: 1) 
where the student spouse attempts to circumvent reimbursement; or 2) where the stu-
dent spouse makes a legitimate alternate career choice. 
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party receiving the education any loans incurred during mar-
riage for that education. This provision merely replaces former 
section 4800(b)(4) of the Civil Code. 
Subdivision (c) of the California Civil Code section 4800.3 
injects a degree of flexibility into the statute by allowing that 
the reimbursement or assignment be modified as is just under 
the circumstances of each case, particularly with respect to three 
instances: 1) where the community has substantially benefited 
from the education; 2) where the education of one party is offset 
by the education of the other party; and 3) where the education 
received by a party reduces that party's need for spousal sup~ 
port. The first limitation contemplates a lengthy marriage and 
the assumption that the community has benefited from its ini-
tial expenditure in one spouse's education through the income 
which has been derived from the education over a period of 
time.133 This premise is also the basis for a rebuttable presump-
tion that a community has already substantially benefited if the 
marriage has lasted ten years after the expenditure. This limita-
tion is designed to "achieve simplicity and justice in the ordi-
nary case" in light of the problems of proof and computation of 
expenditures.134 The second limitation applies when each spouse 
has been educated at the community's expense; "[t]here is in ef-
fect an offset and it makes little sense to require each to reim-
burse the other."13C1 The third specified limitation eliminates re-
imbursement if the party who has been the homemaker in a 
lengthy marriage obtains an education at the community's ex-
pense shortly before dissolution. The Commission states that re-
imbursement would, in this case, be inequitable and notes that 
the education received will usually reduce the spousal support 
award to the educated party. 186 
The Commission recognized that the parties may have dis-
cussed their financial conditions and expectations and come to 
an agreement as to their respective responsibilities. If there is 
such an agreement it should supersede the statutory reimburse-
ment right, but only if it is in writing; the requirement of a writ-
ing is intended to "avoid unmeritorious litigation and to ensure 
133. Recommendation. supra note 23. at 236. 
134. [d. at 237. 
135. [d. at 236. 
136. [d. 
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certainty."137 
B. Critique 
1. Favorable Provisions 
In its favor, the new statute does grant the community re-
imbursement for costs. This approach is consistent with the gen-
eral trend of courts nationwide to allow some type of remedy 
regardless of whether the degree is classified as property. It is 
also consistent with the only other community property 
state-Arizona-to grant a definitive amount of relief.13s In lim-
iting the remedy to reimbursement only,139 the bill will produce, 
in most cases, consistent and predictable results. 
The requirement that the earning capacity be substantially 
enhanced is a well-reasoned limitation. As the Commission has 
noted, the working spouse's expectation in future benefits which 
provide the basis for reimbursement is not present when, for ex-
ample, the student spouse's advanced degree is a Ph.D. in San-
skrit Literature.140 
The three qualifications on reimbursement are also support-
able. Section 4800.3(c)(1) creates, in effect, a ten year statute of 
limitation on reimbursement, subject to a rebuttable presump-
tion that the community has not substa,ntially benefited from 
the education in that ten year span. Michigan, one of the few 
jurisdictions that held a degree to be marital property in one 
case,Ul limited the effect in a subsequent decision142 denying re-
lief where the degree was acquired nineteen years prior to the 
divorce. The rationale of the Watling court in Michigan was the 
same as that behind the California legislation; after a certain 
length of time the community has substantially benefited from 
the degree and has, therefore, no remaining interest in the de-
137. [d. at 237-38. 
138. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 357, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) 
(in granting wife, who supported husband while in law school, restitution to prevent un-
just enrichment of husband, the appellate court limited the award to her financial contri-
bution for husband's living expenses and direct educational costs). 
139. "Reimbursement for community contribution ... is the exclusive remedy of 
the community or a party." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(d) (West Supp. 1985). 
140. Recent Developments, supra note 13, at 215 n.40. 
141. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 261-62, 337 N.W.2d 334 (1983). 
142. Watling v. Watling, 127 Mich. App. 624, 627, 339 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1983). 
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gree. U3 While the Watling court was concerned with valuing a 
degree throughout a career, the California legislation is valuing 
only the costs of the education. Because the reimbursement in-
terest will be less, quantitatively, than an interest in the value of 
a degree as represented by the total earnings it generates, the 
Legislature reasonably concluded that a ten year limitation on 
reimbursement is appropriate. 
California Civil Code section 4800.3(c)(2) allows that the re-
imbursement be reduced or eliminated in the event that the 
"student" spouse reciprocates by supporting the "working" 
spouse while he or she likewise acquires an education.H " This 
provision appears to be intuitively fair so long as the enhance-
ment of each spouse's earning capacity is roughly the same. Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 4800.3(c)(3) provides for an offset in a 
different manner: the homemaker spouse's contributions of 
household duties are "paid back" by an education which allows 
him or her to be self-supporting. The Commission points out 
that it would not make sense to force the spouse who received 
the education to reimburse the community when the obligation 
for spousal support has been either reduced or eliminated by 
virtue of the education of the other spouse. This provision also 
seems fair if the non-homemaker spouse's prior earning capacity 
is not diminished or destroyed as a result of him or her taking 
over the household duties from the homemaker spouse turned 
student. 
2. An Inadequate Remedy 
Despite its strengths the new statute suffers from several 
flaws. A minor flaw is subdivision (e) of California Civil Code 
section 4800.3, which requires that any agreement of the parties 
143. Compare Watling v. Watling, 127 Mich. App. 624, 627, 339 N.W.2d 505, 507 
(1983) (wife already compensated for her contribution to degree by sharing in benefits of 
degree for nineteen years) with CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(c)(l) (West Supp. 1985) (rebut-
table presumption that community has substantially benefited from contributions to the 
.degree made ten years prior to the dissolution proceeding). See also Comment, The In-
terest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590 (1974). The 
author advocates characterizing a degree or education as community property and pro-
poses a formula using a factor which has the effect of progressively decreasing the value 
of the degree over a career. The justification is that the degree is most valuable at the 
outset of a career, but as the practitioner gains more experience his income is attributa-
ble more to his acquired skills than his education. Id. at 609-10. 
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985). 
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contrary to reimbursement be in writing. This provision is harsh 
since it bars a variety of conceivable arrangements. As a practi-
cal matter, few couples would tend to memorialize such an 
agreement. Written agreements are also undesirable as a matter 
of public policy. "[A] rule [characterizing a degree as community 
property] would force the student spouse and working spouse to 
arrive at a fair determination of their rights by means of a mari-
tal agreement and might encourage a dissolution of the mar-
riage."1411 The same objection applies in the case of spouses ar-
riving at an agreement contrary to reimbursement. 
The reimbursement statute is seriously flawed in two ways: 
1) it requires only that the community-not the working 
spouse-be reimbursed, and 2) it fails to reimburse the commu-
nity for the time and effort expended by the student spouse. 
The costs of an education consist of the money spent by the 
working spouse for educational and living expenses, and the 
time spent studying by the student spouse.146 In many cases, the 
total income of the working spouse will be needed for the educa-
tion and living costs. In a sense, both spouses are working full-
time to acquire the degree, and their contributions are equal. If 
the educational expenses and the living' expenses are also 
roughly equal,147 the reimbursement statute returns to the com-
munity one-quarter of the total community contribution to the 
education and, consequently, returns to the working spouse one-
145. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 234-35. 
146. Several commentators have pointed out that there are two other "costs:" the 
"opportunity cost," which represents the foregone opportunity of the working spouse, 
and the "lost wages" which the student spouse would have earned if he or she were not 
in school. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 104, at 818; Krauskopf, supra note 113, at 384-88. 
These costs should not be included in attempting to value the costs of an education. 
They represent income which might have been earned if conditions were otherwise. 
These costs are speculative and should be deemed abandoned by the couple. Parks, Cost 
as the Measure of the Community's Interest in a Spouse's Education, 9 COMM. PROP. J. 
110, 11'5-16 (1982). Consider that if the student obtained a degree, but chose not to prac-
tice in the field or failed trying to practice, the community (assuming the couple has 
stayed together) would have no claim to reimbursement, and would have to absorb the 
loss. 
147. In most cases, educational cost is less than living expenses. For example, the 
total "cost of education" (living expenses plus direct educational costs such as tuition 
and books) at Golden Gate University School of Law was about $18,000 for the 1984-85 
school year. Financial Aid Office, Golden Gate University. Of that total cost, tuition and 
fees are estimated to be about $7,000 and books and supplies to be about $400. The 
"direct educational cost," then, is approximately $7,500. 
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eighth of the total community contribution.148 The Commission 
claims that "[t]his solution in effect gives the working spouse 
the same amount the student spouse was given for the educa-
tion."149 At best, the working spouse is receiving only half the 
expenses given the student spouse. 
The reimbursement statute fails to consider the time which 
the student spouse contributes to the degree. Instead, it allows 
reimbursement only for "money actually contributed."lliO One of 
the fundamental principles of community property is that the 
"time, effort and skills" of both parties in a marriage are com-
munity property. UH The legislature has recognized that commu-
nity expenditures should be reimbursed, yet ignores the time 
and effort of the student, roughly one-half of the community ex-
penditure. Claims that attempting to value the student's time 
and effort would be difficult and impracticaPI!2 cannot justify de-
nying the community relief altogether for this portion of the 
educational expenditure. 
Thus, the statute and the underlying legislative intent are 
internally inconsistent. One basic community property principle 
is strictly adhered to in requiring that the working spouse 
recoup only one-half of costs through reimbursement to the 
community, yet another basic community property principle is 
ignored by excluding the time and effort of the student spouse 
as a compensable community property cost. Either a statutory 
exception must be made to the former provision or the latter 
provision must be followed to effect a truly "equitable solu-
148. Working spouse's contribution (educational expenses (V. + living expenses 
('/4 » = !l2 of total contribution. "Full time hours" spent by student spouse also = !l2 of 
total contribution. Statute requires educational costs (or, roughly V. of total contribu-
tion) be reimbursed to community, in which supporting spouse has a '/2 interest; thus: V. 
(educational expenses) x !l2 (spouse's community interest) = 'Is of total community con-
tribution and is the share ultimately reimbursed to the supporting spouse. 
149. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 235. 
150. [d. at 235 n.7. 
151. Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal. App. 2d 328, 332-33, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (1967) 
(quoting Strohm v. Strohm, 182 Cal. App. 2d 53, 62, 5 Cal. Rptr. 884, 889 (1960». See 
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (West 1982) (property acquired by husband or wife or both 
during marriage is community property). 
152. Recommendation, supra note 23, at.234. While the Law Revision Commission 
was referring to difficulty in valuing the degree itself, the value of the student spouse's 
time expended to acquire the degree can only be realistically measured with reference to 
the value of the degree. See infra notes 200-20 and accompanying text. 
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tion."lG3 Reimbursement to the working spouse directly for all 
educational costs and, perhaps, all or a portion of the living ex-
penses might be considered. 1M As it currently stands, however, 
the reimbursement statute provides an inadequate remedy and 
should represent only an initial approach-not a final solu-
tion-to a complex problem. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN SULLIVAN 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The California Supreme Court, in Sullivan,!G1I stated that it 
granted a hearing to address the issue raised by Janet: "whether 
a spouse, who has made economic sacrifices to enable the other 
spouse to obtain an education, is entitled to compensation upon 
dissolution of the marriage."1116 The court explained that the leg-
islature had intervened by amending the property division and 
spousal support statutes,1117 and remanded the case to the trial 
court to be decided according to these new statutes.1l1S 
The court spent an inordinate amount of time discussing 
the trial court's order to Mark to bear the attorney fees and 
costs. The court stated that a trial court should consider "the 
respective needs and incomes of the parties,"1119 including" 'the 
[paying spouse's] ability to earn, rather than his [or her] current 
earnings.' "160 The court affirmed the lower court's award of at-
153. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 235. 
154. Jurisdictions which allow reimbursement or restitution include all or a portion 
of the student spouse's living expenses as a compensable cost. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. 
Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346,357, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (citing DeLa Rosa v. 
DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981» (award should include compensation for 
direct educational costs and student spouse's living expenses); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 
677 P.2d 814, 823 (Wyo. 1984) (award should afford the supporting spouse an opportu· 
nity to obtain the same advanced degree under the same circumstances). 
155. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 
(1984). 
156. Id. at 766, 691 P.2d at 1022, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Janet Sullivan had appealed 
from the judgment of the trial court denying her an interest in her husband's degree. Id. 
at 765 n.1, 691 P.2d at 1022 n.1, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.1. 
157. Id. at 766-67, 691 P.2d at 1022-23, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. See supra note 120, 
for the text of the statutes. 
158. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 768, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357. 
159. Id., 691 P.2d at 1024, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
160. Id. at 769, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (quoting Meagher v. Mea-
gher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650, 651 (1961)) (brackets in original). 
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torney fees and costs,161 after concluding that the trial court 
could have reasonably inferred that Mark's income from his 
"burgeoning" medical practice would increase and enable him to 
pay the attorney fees and costS.162 
B. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
The court instructed the trial court to "make the findings 
necessary to determine whether and in what amount reimburse~ 
ment and/or support should be awarded under [the] provi~ 
sions,"163 and reversed the judgment "denying any compensation 
for contributions to [the] education."164 Justice Mosk expressed 
a valid concern in his concurring and dissenting opinion that 
this and other "calculated" references to "compensation,"1611 in~ 
stead of "reimbursement," would "mislead the bench and bar" 
and were, therefore, inappropriate.166 He explained: 
At no place in the relevant legislation does the 
word "compensation" appear. With clarity and 
precision, the Legislature referred instead to "re-
imbursement." The terms are not synonymous; 
there is a significant distinction that extends be-
yond mere semantics. Reimbursement implies re-
payment of a debt or obligation; that is what the 
Legislature obviously contemplated. Compensa-
tion, on the other hand, may be payment in any 
sum for any lawful purpose; the Legislature also 
obviously did not intend to give such a blank 
check to trial courts. 167 
Justice Mosk pointed out that the issue of spousal support was 
not before the supreme court,168 and admonished the trial courts 
to not impermissibly expand the statutory remedy by making 
161. Id. at 770, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
162. Id. at 769, 691 P.2d at 1024, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
163. Id. at 768, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357. 
164. Id. 
165. The majority opinion made repeated references to "compensation." Id. at 765, 
766, 768, 770, 691 P.2d at 1021, 1022, 1023, 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 355, 356, 357, 359. 
166. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 770, 691 P.2d 1020, 1025, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 354, 359 (1984) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). 
167. Id. Justice Mosk also noted that the majority opinion does not make clear that 
"compensation" is not to be made to the supporting spouse as an individual. Rather, it 
is "reimbursement" that is due the community, in which both husband and wife have an 
equal interest. Id. 
168. Id. 
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either property awards contrary to the intent of the legisla-
ture,t89 or awards "of any sums for any purpose" other than the 
"exclusive remedy" of reimbursement granted by the statute. l7O 
C. Critique 
Justice Mosk accurately stated that the court was trying to 
expand the remedy granted by the legislature. He was also cor-
rect, however, in observing that reimbursement is a precise and 
finite remedy; the community is limited to money spent for edu-
cational costs only. Thus, the court cannot have been referring 
to the reimbursement statute when it suggested that the work-
ing spouse be compensated. Although Justice Mosk's concern 
with the court's use of "compensation" is justified, the focus of 
his criticism is misdirected when he suggests the majority was 
attempting to expand the reimbursement remedy to include 
"compensation" not contemplated by the reimbursement 
statute. 
The spousal support statute is .not so limited; the amend-
ment requires the court to consider "the extent to which the 
supported spouse contributed to the attainment of an education, 
training, or a license by the other spouse."17l The court re-
manded the case to the trial court to determine the rights of the 
parties with respect to both the new reimbursement provision 
and the amended spousal support provision. Contrary to Justice 
Mosk's assertion, spousal support was an issue in this case and 
afforded the court a flexible means by which to compensate the 
working spouse. 
1. A Modified Basis for Spousal Support 
The court discussed spousal support directly only to the ex-
tent that it instructed the trial court to apply the amended 
spousal support statute to the case on remand.172 However, the 
court discussed the basis for awarding attorney fees and court 
costs at great length.173 The court relied on language from 
169. [d. at 771, 691 P.2d at 1026, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 360. See infra text accompanying 
note 199. 
170. SullilJan, 37 Cal. 3d at 771, 691 P.2d at 1026, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 360. 
171. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4801(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). 
172. SullilJan, 37 CaL 3d at 768, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357. 
173. [d. at 768-69, 691 P.2d at 1024, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
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spousal support cases for its proposition that attorney fees can 
be based, in part, on the future ability of one spouse to pay.174 If 
the court was willing to accept spousal support cases as prece-
dent for attorney fees cases, it may then accept as good author-
ity the use of attorney fees cases, including Sullivan, in subse-
quent spousal support cases. Therefore, the discussion on 
attorney fees in Sullivan may affect the trial court's ruling on 
spousal support on remand. 
The court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees 
and costs and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by inferring that Mark had the ability to pay these 
costs based on his expected increase in income.m Hereby, the 
court created a rule which will allow the trial courts to look to 
the future income of a party when determining the ability to pay 
for legal costs. The authorities cited by the court, however, do 
not support this proposition. 
The court relied primarily on two spousal support cases: 
Meagher v. Meagher176 and Estes v. Estes. 177 In determining the 
"respective needs and incomes of the parties,"178 the supreme 
court stated that "the trial court is not restricted in its assess-
ment of ability to pay to a consideration of salary alone, but may 
174. Id. See infra notes 176·86 and accompanying text. 
175. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 769, 691 P.2d at 1024, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
176. Meagher v. Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1961). For nearly 
two years prior to the couple's separation, the husband had earned $2,083 per month 
working for a family owned corporation. He terminated that employment almost imme-
diately after the separation and took a position which paid $624.05 per month at a firm 
his family was planning to purchase. He was 41 years old and in good health. Id. at 63, 
11 Cal. Rptr. at 650-51. 
The husband appealed the trial court's order directing him to pay his wife and mi· 
nor children $750 per month as temporary alimony and support. Id. at 62, 11 Cal. Rptr. 
at 650. The appellate court upheld the award, and noted that the trial court acted within 
its discretion to evaluate "the peculiar coincidence of salary reduction ... and marital 
separation." Id. at 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 651. 
177. Estes v. Estes, 158 Cal. App. 2d 94, 322 P.2d 238 (1958). The husband appealed 
the trial court's order requiring support payments to his wife, allegedly in excess of his 
income, and enjoining him from disposing of any community or separate property except 
in the due course of business or for the necessities of life. [d. at 95-96, 322 P.2d at 239-
40. The husband had assets worth $410,000, including his corporate business and family 
home. The appellate court noted that the husband had the ability to pay the support by 
selling his assets. Support payments were one "necessity of life" contemplated by the 
trial court's injunction. Id. at 97, 322 P.2d at 240. 
178. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 768, 691 P.2d 1020, 1024, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 358 (1984). 
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consider all the evidence concerning the parties' income, assets 
and abilities."179 The reference to "abilities" was not, in the 
cited case, Estes, to future ability to earn income. It referred to 
the present ability of the husband to sell stock and corporate 
assets in his name by means of a clause in the court order that 
he may sell these assets for "the necessities of life," including 
support payments.180 
The Sullivan court also held the trial court's finding that 
"respondent's [husband's] burgeoning medical practice would 
continue to flourish and that his income would increase dramati-
cally"181 was a reasonable inference, and stated: 
"[T]he cases have frequently and uniformly held 
that the court may base its decision on the [pay-
ing spouse's] ability to earn, rather than his [or 
her] current earnings ... " for the simple reason 
that in cases such as this current earnings give a 
grossly distorted view of the paying spouse's fi-
nancial ability.182 
The court's reference to "cases such as this" was taken out of 
context. The court in the cited case, Meagher, was referring to 
circumstances in which the husband was "one who ... engaged 
in a seasonal industry or whose earnings had widely fluctu-
ated."183 In Meagher, the court was looking to the husband's 
past ability to earn a living to establish what he is presently able 
to pay, rather than looking to his ability to earn in the future to 
establish what he can presently pay.18" Furthermore, the sup-
porting cases cited by the court in Meagherl8 r> were mostly cases 
in which the husband had voluntarily quit working or taken a 
decrease in pay to ostensibly avoid alimony payments.186 
179. Id. 
180. Estes v. Estes, 158 Cal. App. 2d 94, 97, 322 P.2d 238, 240 (1958). 
181. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 769, 691 P.2d at 1024, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
182. Id., 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (quoting Meagher v. Meagher, 190 
Cal. App. 2d 62, 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650, 651 (1961» (brackets in original; emphasis added). 
183. Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d at 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 651. 
184. Id. But cf. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 769, 691 P.2d 1020, 1024· 
25,209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 358-59 (husband's future ability to earn examined whether he can 
presently pay attorney fees). 
185. Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d at 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52 (citing Pencovic v. 
Pencovic, 45 Cal. 2d 97, 100, 287 P.2d 501, 502·03 (1955); Hall v. Hall, 42 Cal. 2d 435, 
442, 267 P.2d 249, 253 (1954); Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal. 2d 153, 160, 199 P.2d 934, 939 
(1948); Elliott v. Elliott, 162 Cal. App. 2d 350, 357, 328 P.2d 291, 296 (1958». 
186. Pencovic v. Pencovic, 45 Cal. 2d 97, 100·02, 287 P.2d 501, 502·04 (1955); Web· 
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The Sullivan court used this new "future ability to pay" 
standard to uphold the trial court's award of attorney fees and 
costs. Both parties' financial statements indicated that their 
monthly expenses exceeded their monthly incomes by "several 
hundred dollars" (wife)187 and "over $800" (husband).188 Under 
traditional standards, neither party would be entitled to attor-
ney fees or costs as neither had the ability to pay. Applying the 
new test, however, the court was willing to infer that the hus-
band would be able to pay in the future if his income continued 
to increase.189 
The new standard sets a disturbing precedent for spousal 
support awards. It may, as well, influence the decision of the 
trial court to award spousal support in Sullivan on remand. At-
torney fees and court costs awards are based on "the respective 
needs and incomes of the parties."19o Similarly, spousal support 
is based on the "circumstances of the parties,"191 that is, their 
respective needs and abilities to pay, 192 and other statutorily 
enumerated factors. 19S Generally, the spouses' "ability to earn" 
ber v. Webber, 33 Cal. 2d 153, 160, 199 P.2d 934, 939 (1948). 
Although Elliott and Hall, the remaining cases cited, do not involve a husband who 
was attempting to avoid making alimony payments, they certainly do not support the 
proposition that future earnings may be considered in an award of alimony. In Elliott, 
the appellate court affirmed the support award, citing Webber, 33 Cal. 2d at 160, 199 
P.2d at 939, and noting that the husband had earnings and income from various sources. 
Elliott v. Elliott, 162 Cal. App. 2d 350, 356-57, 328 P.2d 291, 296 (1958). In Hall, the 
supreme court held the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding support to the 
wife, where the husband's income after he paid the support would not be sufficient for 
his living expenses. Hall v. Hall, 42 Cal. 2d 435, 442, 167 P.2d 249, 253 (1954). 
187. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 769, 691 P.2d at 1024, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. at 768. 
191. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4801(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). 
192. See CAL. CIY. CODE § 4801 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); W. HOGOBOOM & D. KING, 
FAMILY LAW 11 6:79 (student ed. 1984). 
193. Section 4801(a) of the California Civil Code provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a marriage or 
a legal separation of the parties, the court may order a party 
to pay for the support of the other party any amount, and for 
any period of time, as the court may deem just and reasona-
ble. In making the award, the court shall consider all of the 
following circumstances of the respective parties: 
(1) The earning capacity of each spouse, taking into account 
the extent to which the supported spouse's present and future 
earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that 
were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported 
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is based on present income absent "evidence of attempts to 
avoid financial responsibilities by deliberately suppressing in-
come."194 Furthermore, while "need" is not a threshold factor 
and must be considered with respect to all the statutory fac-
tors,t91$ "a support award would be inappropriate where the ap-
plicant spouse is capable of self-support."l96 
If the trial court applied the statutory considerations in the 
traditional manner to the Sullivans, neither party was likely to 
be eligible for support.197 Even with the amendment to Califor-
nia Civil Code section 4801(a)(1), the outcome would probably 
be the same. The amended subdivision bears on the spouse's 
ability to become self-supporting.198 A spouse who has put the 
other spouse through graduate school has probably already 
spouse to devote time to domestic duties and the extent to 
which the supported spouse contributed to the attainment of 
an education, training, or a license by the other spouse. 
(2) The needs of each party. 
(3) The obligations and assets, including the separate prop-
erty, of each. 
(4) The duration of the marriage. 
(5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful 
employment without interfering with the interests of depen-
dent children in the custody of the spouse. 
(6) The time required for the supported spouse to acquire ap-
propriate education, training, and employment. 
(7) The age and health of the parties. 
(8) The standard of living of the parties. 
(9) Any other factors which it deems just and equitable. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(I)-(9) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). 
194. W. HOGOBOOM & D. KING, FAMILY LAW 11 6:89 (student ed. 1984). 
195. Id. 11 6:92.1. 
196. Id. 11 6:93. 
197. "[B)ecause [Janet) Sullivan could not show a present need, she did not receive 
any spousal support .... " In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 824 (Ct. App. 
Aug. 2, 1982) (Ziebarth, J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 
691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). Although, at present, Janet may be in "need," 
as her monthly expenses exceed her income by "several hundred dollars," Mark does not 
have a present ability to pay, as his expenses also exceed his income, by $800. See In re 
Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 769, 691 P.2d 1020, 1024, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 358 
(1984). 
In addition, the remaining statutory factors, taken collectively, militate against a 
support award: the marriage was relatively short (seven years); Janet Sullivan is capable 
of engaging in gainful employment (she was earning $26,000 annually at the time of dis-
solution, according to the appellate court in its first Sullivan opinion); both parties are 
relatively young and in good health; the couple's standard of living was modest during 
marriage, as most of Janet Sullivan's income was put toward medical school and living 
expenses. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(4)-(8) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). 
198. W. HOGOBOOM & D. KING, FAMILY LAW 11 6:88 (student ed. 1984). 
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demonstrated he or she is capable of self-support. 
2. The Modified Standard is Undesirable 
If the trial court follows the lead of the California Supreme 
Court and applies the new "future ability to earn" standard, the 
court could likely find that the working spouse is eligible for 
spousal support when the opposite conclusion would be reached 
if it applied traditional spousal support standards. This is con-
trary to the clear intent of the legislature: 
Ordinarily, discrepancies in the earning capacities 
of the parties are remedied by spousal support. In 
many cases, however, the working spouse does not 
qualify for support because his or her earnings, 
while substantially lower than the student 
spouse's future earnings, are nonetheless suffi-
cient for self-support. While it would be possible 
to revise the basic support standards, the Com-
mission deems it inadvisable to disrupt the es-
tablished support scheme in order to deal with 
this circumscribed problem. 199 
In addition to being contrary to legislative intent, the new 
standard is unfair to the spouse charged with the spousal sup-
port. If an award is based on expected future income, the profes-
sional spouse may be compelled to pay support even though cur-
rent expenses significantly exceed income. This increases his or 
her present debt. In addition, the professional spouse will not be 
able to recover the "excess" support he or she has paid due to 
miscalculation, if the professional's actual income does not meet 
projected income, or if he or she decides to pursue a lower pay-
ing career. These potential problems are better resolved by the 
current scheme of spousal support, which allows the court to 
modify an award in the future or to retain jurisdiction to award 
support in the future if the paying spouse's income actually in-
creases significantly. 
The supreme court's apparent revision in Sullivan of the 
standards for spousal support is a rejection of the remedy cre-
ated by the legislature. The amended spousal support statute is 
ineffective, leaving the supporting spouse in the same position 
199. Recommendation, supra note 23, at 234 (emphasis added). 
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he or she was in prior to the amendment; that is, he or she has 
demonstrated the ability for self-support and is likely ineligible 
for spousal support. The supporting spouse therefore must look 
to the reimbursement statute for relief. However, the reimburse-
ment statute is inadequate. It ignores the community contribu-
tions of the student spouse's time and effort and reimburses the 
community only for money expended for education. The court 
was compelled to rectify the inequity to the supporting spouse 
by expansively interpreting the spousal support statute because 
the remedy provided by the reimbursement statute is so limited. 
The proposal outlined below would grant an additional measure 
of reimbursement to the working spouse and reduce the need for 
compensation through a new standard of spousal support. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The objective of this proposal is to reimburse the commu-
nity for time and effort expended by the student spouse, rather 
than granting to the supporting spouse a proprietary interest in 
the degree or the earning potential of its holder. The appellate 
court, in its first Sullivan opinion,20o laid the groundwork for a 
fair and practical solution which fully comports with California 
law. 
A. A Professional Degree £s the Student Spouse's Sepa-
rate Property 
A degree or right to practice is a valuable property right.201 
By its nature, a degree or right to practice must be the separate 
property of the possessor.202 It is conferred upon a' person who 
has achieved a certain level of expertise and can be used only by 
the holder. Although the degree must necessarily follow its 
holder, the community interest should be protected to the ex-
tent that community assets and efforts were used to attain the 
200. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 8 FAM. L, REP. (BNA) 2165 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 
1982), modified, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1982), aff'd and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 
762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). 
201. E.g., In re Riccardi, 182 Cal. 675, 679, 189 P. 694, 695 (1920) (right to practice 
law was a valuable property right); Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 
592, 84 P. 39, 40 (1906) (right to practice medicine was a valuable property right). 
202. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 8 FAM. L. REP, (BNA) 2165,2166 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
8, 1982), modified, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1982), aff'd and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 
762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). 
41
Rhodes: Sullivan Revisited
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
568 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:527 
degree. 203 The appellate court, in its first Sullivan opinion, at-
tempted to determine the community interest in the student 
spouse's separate degree by applying the line of cases concerning 
profits from separately owned businesses.204 The cases consider-
ing the community interest in separately owned businesses are 
not truly analogous to the community interest in a separately 
possessed degree. The former is based on the assumption that 
there are profits which must be distributed. In the case of a de-
203. See generally Comment, supra note 143. The author suggests that two ele-
ments be considered to determine whether a professional education is community 
property: 
First, whether an education is capable of such a general con-
ceptual classification, insofar as it possesses certain attributes 
common to other recognized forms of property; and second, 
does protection of the community's interest in that which is 
acquired during marriage require an education be deemed 
property? The weight given each of these considerations will 
vary with individual situations, but neither should be consid-
ered to the exclusion of the other. 
Id. at 599 (citations omitted). The author answers both elements affirmatively. Id. at 
600-02. 
This Comment takes the contrary view with respect to the first element (see supra 
notes 105-16 and accompanying text), and agrees, in part, with the second. The commu-
nity's interest can be adequately protected by deeming the degree separate property, 
subject to reimbursement to the community. 
204. See In re Marriage of Sullivan, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2165, 2166 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 8, 1982), modified, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1982), aff'd and rev'd, 37 
Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). See also In re Marriage of Sulli-
van, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 814-15 (Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1982) (Ziebarth, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), aff'd and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 
(1984). Justice Ziebarth, who wrote the opinion for the court in the first Sullivan deci-
sion, adopts much of that prior opinion for his dissent in the second Sullivan decision. 
Thus, those portions of the first appellate court decision in Sullivan which have been 
deleted from the text as reported in Sullivan, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) at 2165, are accu-
rately reiterated in Justice Ziebarth's dissent. 
Specifically, Justice Ziebarth suggests the cases which determine the community in-
terest in the profits of a separately owned business be applied to a professional degree. 
Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15. Justice Ziebarth cites, in particular, two cases: Pereira 
v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 
885 (1921). In both cases, the respective courts were confronted with the problem of 
determining what amount of the profits of one of the spouse's separate business is due to 
the personal efforts of that spouse (the efforts which are community property) as op-
posed to his or her capital investment (which is separate property because it was owned 
by the spouse prior to marriage). The "Pereira Method" of apportionment allocates a 
fair return on the investment to the spouse who owns the separate business and allocates 
the excess profit to the community. Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (citing Pereira, 156 
Cal. at 7, 103 P. at 490-91). The "Van Camp Method" of apportionment requires a de-
termination of the reasonable value of the spouse's services, allocates that amount as 
community property, and treats the balance as the separate property of the spouse who 
owns the business. Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (citing Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. at 24-
25, 199 P. at 888). 
c 
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gree followed by a divorce, there are no profits as yet to 
distribute. 
B. Reimburse the Community for Improvements to the 
Student Spouse's Property 
A more appropriate analogy is suggested by the cases deal-
ing with community funds used to improve the separate real 
property of one of the spouses.2011 The remedy granted in such 
instances is one based on equitable principles of unjust enrich-
ment and allows either reimbursement for the amount expended 
or the value added.206 Although the remedy granted in these 
cases is generally based on fault or a breach of fiduciary duty,207 
equitable relief may be granted on the sole basis that a party has 
been unjustly enriched.208 
205. See, c.g., In re Marriage of Warren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782-83,104 Cal. Rptr. 
860, 864 (1972) (the husband was entitled to community reimbursement of $38,000 
where that amount in community funds was used to improve the wife's separate prop-
erty, even though the value of the property at the time of trial was $33,952). 
206. See id. at 782, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 863-64. See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.5 (1973). 
207. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Warren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
860, 863 (1972). 
208. See, e.g., Kossian v. American National Insurance Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 
650-51, 62 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227-28 (1967) (where plaintiff was engaged to haul debris and 
plaintiff's employer went bankrupt, the court found an equitable obligation imposed by 
law on the defendant insurance company to reimburse the plaintiff for work performed 
to prevent the unjust enrichment of defendant). See generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF 
CALIFORNIA LAW § 42 (8th ed. 1973) (restitution may be based on unjust enrichment 
alone). 
Two commentators have addressed the question of whether the Sullivan situation 
can be remedied in the context of a breach of a fiduciary duty, and have come to oppo-
site conclusions. Compare Krauskopf, supra note 113, at 392 (remedy available) with 
Comment, supra note 150, at 594 (remedy not available). A more appropriate basis for 
relief is suggested by RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 58 (1937) (gifts made 
in reliance on a relation): 
A person who has conferred a benefit upon another, mani-
festing that he does not expect compensation therefore, is not 
entitled to restitution merely because his expectation that an 
existing relation will continue or that a future relation will 
come into existence is not realized, unless the conferring of the 
benefit is conditioned thereon. 
Comment: 
a. The rule stated in this Section is applicable to a hus-
band or wife who make gifts to the other spouse in the expec-
tation that the relation will continue . . . . 
b. Conditional gifts. The gift may be conditional upon the 
continuance or creation of a relation, and if conditional the 
donor is entitled to its return if the relation terminates or is 
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The remedy was created by courts which recognized the in-
herent inequity of denying relief to the community simply be-
cause the improvement became affixed to the separate prop-
erty209 and severing the improvement was impractical. Likewise, 
an education cannot be returned and the time and money used 
to obtain it refunded. The 'holder has sole possession of it for 
life. 
The community should have returned to it both money and 
time expended to acquire the student spouse's separate prop-
erty, through reimbursement for either the amount expended or 
the value of the benefit conferred. The new statute reimburses 
the community for the community funds actually spent. As pre-
viously noted, there is no similar provision to protect the com-
munity's interest in the student spouse's time and effort. Be-
cause the expended amount of this unique asset cannot be 
readily quantified, as can money paid for tuition, the benefit 
conferred by the student's efforts must be identified and valued 
in order to reimburse the community. 
C. Valuing the Benefit Conferred 
The benefit conferred is the increase in the student spouse's 
earning capacity which results from the degree. Calculating the 
value of this benefit admittedly poses a problem. The appellate 
court, in its first Sullivan opinion, suggested a comparison be-
tween the income of the degree holder after the acquisition of 
the license to the income of the same individual immediately 
before the acquisition.2l0 This comparison has been criticized as 
representing only the value of the right to practice.211 If this 
not entered into. The condition may be stated in specific 
words or it may be inferred from the circumstances. 
Id. (emphasis added). f:learly, the supporting spouse would not make the financial and 
emotional sacrifices if he or she knew of the divorce beforehand. 
Due to the unique problems presented by attempting to fit a degree within existing 
provisions, it may be more practical and realistic to proceed under general restitutionary 
principles: "A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is re-
quired to make restitution to the other." Id. at § 1. 
209. See In re Marriage of Warren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 781-82, 104 Cal. Rptr. 860, 
863 (1972) (citing Provost v. Provost, 102 Cal. App. 775, 781, 783 P. 842, 844 (1929)). 
210. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2165, 2166 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
8, 1982), modified, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1982), aff'd and rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 
762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). 
211. Bruch, supra note 104, at 818 n.190. 
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comparison were expanded to measure the difference between 
the income of the degree holder after the acquisition of the li-
cense to the income of the same individual immediately before 
starting his professional education, the value of the degree and 
right to practice could be accurately measured. 
This theory could be further refined. The appellate court in 
Sullivan suggested that the comparison be made for a "reasona-
ble period."212 Because the goal is to reimburse the community 
for time and effort expended in the years it took to acquire the 
degree, the period should be a factor equal to the number of 
years the working spouse supported the student spouse. For a 
law degree this would be three years, for a medical degree and 
specialization it would be four to seven years. The value of the 
student spouse's income before and after obtaining the profes-
sional degree would be based on the facts of each case, but the 
following guidelines would apply.213 
The pre-education income would be the income of the stu-
dent spouse immediately prior to the professional education. If 
he or she went directly from undergraduate school to graduate 
school, an average income for a person of the student spouse's 
education thus far could be estimated: the average income of a 
college graduate or minimum wage at the absolute least. 
If the professional spouse is in his or her first position and 
the trial is within that first year of employment, the upper in-
come figure would equal the starting salary.214 If the couple sep-
arates, the professional starts his first job, and the trial does not 
212. Sullivan, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) at 2166. 
213. The salaries used for the examples in notes 214·16, infra, are from a survey, 
Tenth Annual Attorney Salary Survey, conducted by David J. White & Associates, a 
Chicago legal placement firm. Habeeb, New Report on Salaries in San Francisco Law 
Offices, The Recorder, Nov. 11, 1984, at I, col. 4. The average annual starting salary of a 
college graduate will be estimated at $15,000 for the purpose of these illustrative 
examples. 
214. The average starting salary for an attorney in a non·patent law firm in San 
Francisco is $29,000. Habeeb, supra note 213. Assume the student spouse's salary with 
only a college degree would have been $15,000. Because the supporting spouse has pro-
vided three years of support to the student spouse while in law school, the factor is three 
(3). 
Thus, the community would be reimbursed for $42,000: ($29,000 - $15,000) x 3 = 
$42,000. The supporting spouse has a one-half community interest in this amount, and 
would receive $21,000. 
45
Rhodes: Sullivan Revisited
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
572 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:527 
take place until more than a year later, the upper income figure 
should still be the starting salary. Any increase in earnings be-
tween the starting year salary and the subsequent annual salary 
at trial two or three years later is the result of the spouse's own 
post-marital work and should not be included in valuation.215 If, 
on the other hand, the student obtains his degree and license, 
starts to work, and the ·separation occurs several years thereaf-
ter, the upper income level will be the present salary at the time 
of separation. This would include the starting salary and in-
creases since then because the supporting spouse contributed his 
or her efforts during marriage in obtaining that wage increase.216 
The community's interest calculated pursuant to the above 
guidelines is the difference between the lower and the upper in-
come figures multiplied by a factor equal to the number of years 
the working spouse supported the student spouse. The support-
ing spouse is awarded one-half of this amount.217 
The trial court should be instructed to retain jurisdiction in 
this matter for a period of five years.218 The professional spouse 
could then circumvent the valuation only by foregoing his or her 
earning potential for five years. The economic consequences of 
such action should prevent most deliberate attempts to avoid 
215. The average salary for an attorney in San Francisco with three years experience 
is $39,500. Habeeb, supra note 213. If the student spouse started at a salary of $29,000, 
then separated from the supporting spouse, and at the time of trial three years later was 
earning $39,500, the income differential would still be $14,000, or the pre-separation 
itarting salary of $29,000, less $15,000. The supporting spouse would again receive 
$21,000. See supra note 214. 
216. The average salary for an attorney in San Francisco with four years experience 
is $42,000. Habeeb, supra note 213. If the student spouse had attained this salary, and 
the couple then separated, the income differential would be $27,000 ($42,000 - $15,000). 
The factor would still be three (3), equal to the number of years the supporting spouse 
supported the student spouse while in law school. The four years between the acquisition 
of the law de~ree and the separation are not added to the factor, because the community 
has not lost anything during that period; the student spouse's time and effort have been 
immediately returned to the community in the form of the student spouse's income. 
Thus, the community would be reimbursed for $81,000: ($42,000 - $15,000) x 3 = 
$81,000. The supporting spouse has a one-half community interest in this amount, and 
would receive $40,500. 
217. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted this as one of several approaches in 
valuing the interest of the supporting spouse in a professional degree. See supra notes 
52-59 and accompanying text. 
218. If the professional spouse did not pursue his or her career immediately, but 
decided several years later to do so, the supporting spouse could not recover until that 
time. 
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this valuation and distribution. 
Alternatively, if the professional decided not to start prac-
ticing, but elected to pursue a different career, there would be 
no benefit to be valued and the supporting spouse would recover 
from the reimbursement to the community for the cost of the 
education pursuant to California Civil Code section 4800.3.219 
This solution has several advantages. It is simple and re-
quires minimal speculation. It allows the professional the free-
dom to choose his or her occupation, yet guarantees the support-
ing spouse at least minimum reimbursement of cost in the event 
the professional chooses not to pursue his or her career. The dif-
ferential allows the true and actual value of the degree to be 
calculated with minimum conflict with the community property 
principle that post-separation earnings are separate property. 
Finally, application of this proposal should produce consistent 
and predictable results useful to both courts and practitioners. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Even if a degree is properly characterized as the separate 
property of its holder, the community should not be denied ade-
quate relief for the contributions it has made in obtaining the 
degree. The legislature, in its attempt to rectify the gross ineq-
uity of allowing the student spouse to leave the marriage with 
such a "windfall" and requiring reimbursement for educational 
costs, has ignored the obvious contributions of the time and the 
effort to the degree by the student spouse. 
The California Supreme Court recognized the inadequacy of 
the enacted statutes and, in Sullivan, attempted to bolster an 
otherwise ineffective amendment to the statutory guidelines for 
spousal support. Contrary to clearly expressed legislative intent, 
the court has created a modified rule of spousal support based 
on one spouse's "future ability to pay" for an award. In doing so, 
the court has not only disrupted the existing law of spousal sup-
219. The proposal can be incorporated as § 4800.3(b)(2) of the California Civil Code, 
with the present § 4800.3(b)(2) of the Civil Code redesignated as § 4800.3(b)(3). The 
balance of the provisions, § 4800.3(c)(I)-(3) of the Civil Code, are retained for this pro-
posal. Also, § 4800.3(a) of the Civil Code would have to be modified to include within 
that subdivision's definition of "community contributions" the time and effort expended 
by the student spouse. See supra note 120 for the text of the current statutes. 
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port but may in effect, place a speculative value on the antici-
pated income of one spouse and award to the other spouse a 
portion of that anticipated income under the guise of spousal 
support. 
The court's decision must be interpreted as a rejection of 
the solution offered by the legislature through AB 3000. The 
proposal described in this Comment, in combination with the re-
imbursement currently required,220 would balance the equities 
between the spouses and prevent the demise of spousal support 
as we now know it. 
Bruce H. Rhodes* 
220. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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